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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1584, Lanfranco da Oriano, one the first scholars of
commercial arbitration in the period of the Law Merchant, published
an essay in Venice in which he noticed that the "subject of arbitration
is of a great utility but it is always badly explained by legal
scholars."' Five centuries later, many businessmen still agree with
Lanfranco since their perception of the law of international trade
seems completely different from that of many legal scholars,
including their lawyers.
In truth, a reconciliation of the two visions is possible since it is
the most important task of any (good) international arbitrator. This
task is easier today with reference to the UNIDROIT Principles for
international commercial contracts. The growth of a global economy
rooted in the cosmopolitan nature of commerce and the development
of new means of transportation and communication demand the
2
prompt formation of a uniform transnational commercial law.

1.

Lanfranco da Oriano, Materiam arbitrorum utilem fore et quotidianam a

nostrisque doctoribus male esplicatam, in TRACTATUS DE ARBITRIS 206 (1584). See
generally FABRIZIO MARRELLA & A. MOZZATO, ALLE ORIGINI DELL'ARBITRATO
COMMERCIALE INTERNAZIONALE. L'ARBITRATO A VENEZIA TRA MEDIOEVO ED ETA
MODERNA (2001).

2.
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994), 34 I.L.M. 1067 (1995)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles]. See Le droit commercial uniforme au XXI si&le,
Actes du Congr~s de la CNUDCI, New York, May 18-22, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.D/1, 1995; see generally FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA (2001)
(discussing the ancient Law Merchant and its afterlife); Fabrizio Marrella & Fabian
G61inas, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts in ICC
Arbitration, 10 ICC INT'L COURT OF ARB. BULL. 26, 26-119 (1999) (discussing the
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Whether one agrees or disagrees with lex mercatoria doctrines, one
must accept the fact that a significant number of awards have made
reference to them, whatever that means. 3 Legal scholars have tried to

application of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts in ICC
arbitration); Fabrizio Marrella, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts in ICC Arbitration (1999-2001), 12 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 49, 49-115
(2001) (discussing the latest applications); Fabrizio Marrella, La nuova lex mercatoria,
in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO DELL'ECONOMIA DIRETTO

DA FRANCESCO GALGANO (2003) (discussing results and further applications).
3.
See Berthold Goldman, Arbitrage internationalet droit comun des nations,
1956 REV. ARB. 115, 115 and accompanying notes; Fronticresdu droit et lex mercatoria,
[1964] ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIC DU DROIT 177, 177 and accompanying notes (1964);
Berthold Goldman La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et l'arbitrage international:
rdalitg et perspectives, 106 J. DU DROIT INT'L 475, 475-99 (1979); La volontd des parties
et le r6le de l'arbitrage dans l'arbitrage international, 1981 REV. ARB. 469-81; see
generally The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law--the Lex Mercatoria, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113 (Julian D.M. Lew ed.,
1986); L'arbitre, les conflits de lois et la lex mercatoria, in ACTES DU LER COLLOQUE SUR
L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 103 (Prujiner Antaki ed., 1986); Nouvelles
rdflexions sur la lex mercatoria, in ETUDES P. LALIVE 241 (1993); PHILIPPE KAHN, LA
VENTE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL; Philippe Kahn, Lex mercatoria et Euroobligations, in FESTSCHRIFT C. SCHMITTOFF 240 (1973); PHILIPPE KAHN, LEX
MERCATORIA ET PRATIQUE DES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX; Philippe Kahn, L'essor du

non droit dans les relations commerciales internationaleset le contrat sans loi, in
L'HYPOTHESE DU NON DROIT 231 (1978); Philippe Kahn, Droit internationaliconomique,

droit du developpement et Lex mercatoria, concept unique ou pluralisme des ordres
juridiques, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES, ETUDES
OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 97 (Litec ed., 1982); Philippe Kahn, Rapport franvais,
in LE ROLE DE LA PRATIQUE DANS LA FORMATION DU DROIT 247 (Henry Capitant ed.,
1985); PHILIPPE KAHN, DROIT ET MONNAIE: ETATS ET ESPACE MONETAIRE
TRANSNATIONAL (1988); Philippe Kahn, Les principes gindraux du droit devant les
arbitres internationaux, 116 J. DU DROIT INT'L 305 (1989); Philippe Kahn, La lex

mercatoria, point de vue franqais aprds quarante ans de controverse, 37 MCGILL L.J.
413 (1992); Philippe Kahn, Linternationalisationde la vente, in ETUDES PLANTEY 297
(1995); Philippe Kahn, Les Principes d'UNIDROIT comme droit applicable aux contrats
internationaux, in CONTRATTI COMMERCIALI INTERNAZIONALI E PRINCIPI UNIDROIT 39

(Michael Joachim Bonell & F. Bonelli eds. 1997); Philippe Kahn, Vers l'institutionnalisation
de la lex mercatoria:a propos des principes d'UNIDROIT relatifs aux contrats du commerce
international, in LIBER AMICORUM COMMISSION DROIT ET VIE DES AFFAIRES 125 (1988);

Philippe Kahn, Les contrats internationaux de coopgration scientifique et technique
inter-entreprisesface aux Principes d'UNIDROIT, RDU/ULR 519-24 (1988); Philippe
Kahn, A propos de l'ordre public transnational:quelques observations, in MELANGES
FRITZ STURM 1539-50 (1999); Philippe Kahn, A propos des sources du droit du
commerce international, in MELANGES FARJAT 185 (1997); Jacques Beguin, Le
ddveloppement de la lex mercatoria menace-t-il l'ordre juridique international,30
MCGILL L.J. 478, 478-538 (1985); J. Mousseron, Lex mercatoria:bonne mauvaise idge
ou mauvaise bonne idge?, in MELANGES L. BOYER 469 (1996); Ren6 David, /1 diritto del
commercio internazionale: un nuovo compito per i legislatori nazionalio una nuova lex
mercatoria?,Rfv. DIR. CIV. 578 (1976); Aleksander Goldstajn, The New Law Merchant,
J. BUS. L. 12-17 (1961); Aleksander Goldstajn, The New Law Merchant Reconsidered, in
Law and International Trade, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF ZUM 70
GEBURTSTAG 171 (1973); Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International
Commercial Transactions(Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978); Bernado M.
Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the
Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 317 (1984); Ole
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Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L COMP.
L.Q. 747 (1985); Ole Lando, Lex mercatoria 1985-1996, in 2 FESTSKRIFT TILL STIG
STROMHOLM 576-84 (Ake Frandberg ed., 1997); F. Bortolotti, La "nuova" Lex
mercatoria: Costruzione dottrinaria o strumento operativo?, in CONTRATTO E
IMP/EUROPA 734 (1996); I. Strenger, La notion de lex mercatoriaen droit du commerce
international, 11 R.C.A.D.I. 207, 207-355, tbl. 227 (1991); F. DASSER, INTERNATIONALE
ScHIEDSGERiCHTE UND Lx MERCATORum (1989); P.F. WEISE, LEx MERCATOR!: MATERIELLES
RECHT VOR DER INTERNATIONALEN HANDELSSCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (1990); RICCARDO
MEYER, BONA FIDES UND LEX MERCATORIA IN DER EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSTRADITION
(1994); U. STEIN, LEX MERCATORIA: REALITAET UND THEORIE 1-318 (1995); RICARDO
MONACO, Note sulla qualificazione della lex mercatoria, in STUDI GORLA 1249-66
(1984); Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex MercatoriaDoctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 943 (1997);
Emmanuel Gaillard, Trente ans de lex mercatoria;pour une application sdlective de la
mdthode des principes gindraux du droit, 122 J. Du DROIT INT'L 5 (1995); Hilmar
Raeschke-Kessler, The UNIDROIT Principles for InternationalCommercial Contracts:
A New Lex Mercatoria?, ICC/DOSSIER 167 (1995); LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL
PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (C. Donahue,
Jr. ed., 1988); PHILIPPE DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORA
260 (1992); Philippe de Ly, Lex mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalization and
International Self-Regulation, DIR. COMMERCIALE INT'L 555, 555-90 (2000); Friedrich
K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private InternationalLaw, RDU/ULR 171 (2000);
Barton S. Selden, Lex mercatoriain European and U.S. Trade Practice:Time to Take a
Closer Look, in GOLDEN GATE U. SCHOOL OF LAW ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1995); MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, LA MODERNA LEX
MERCATORIA TRA MITO E REALTA 315-32 (1996); Michael Joachim Bonell, Voce Lex
Mercatoria, DIG. SEZ. COMM. 11, 11-17 (1993); Vi spazio per una lex mercatoria?, in
SIDI, LA RIFORMA DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 200 (1999); Friedrich K.
Jeunger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 L.A. L. REV. 1133
(2000); LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1988) (especially essays by Audit, Smit, and Lowenfeld);
KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF LEX MERCATORIA (1999); Eric
Loquin, O6 en est la lex mercatoria?, in MiLANGES PHILIPPE KAHN 23-51 (2000); A.
Pellet, La lex mercatoria, "tiers ordre juridique'? Remarques ingdnues d'un
internationaliste de droit public, in MELANGES PHILIPPE KAHN 54-74 (2000); W.
LAWRENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 639 (2000). For critics of the doctrine, see generally Paul
Lagarde, Approche critique & la lex mercatoria, in MitLANGES GOLDMAN 145 (1987);
ANTONE KASSIS, THEORIE GENERALE DES USAGES SU COMMERCE, DROIT COMPARE,
CONTRATS ET ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAUX, LEX MERCATORIA (1984); Gbenga Bamodu,
Exploring the Interrelationships of Transnational Commercial Law, "The New Lex
Mercatoria" and International Commercial Arbitration, AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31
(1998); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and InternationalContracts: A
Challenge for InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 657, 65859 (1999); Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria,63 TUL. L. REV. 613 (1989);
Lord Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER
AMICORUM LORD WILBERFORCE 181 (1987):
Essentially, the lex mercatoriais a doctrine of laissez-faire.In very many parts of
the world it is considered that the exercise of free consent by individual parties
must be subordinated to broader economic and political considerations bearing on
international trade. Furthermore, the disfavour with which transnational groups
or corporations are now regarded in some quarters cannot but hinder the general
acceptance of a doctrine whose legitimacy is seen, rightly or wrongly, as derived
at least in part from the existence of such bodies ...the proponents of the lex
mercatoriaclaim it to be the law of the international business community: which
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solve the Babel of law dilemma, which was announced with much
worry by the French comparatist Ren6 David, by creating a
compilation of principles intended to provide one codified answer to
the challenge of lex mercatoria. The dawn of the third millennium
witnesses the spread of one of the twentieth century's most striking
legal innovations: the codification of general principles of
international commercial contract law under a nonbinding format by
an international organization. New actors of international trade call
for new rules, and the winds of change are affecting the regulatory
activity patterns of some international organizations. A striking
example is UNIDROIT.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) was established at the beginning of the 20th century in
order to promote the international uniformity of state legislations.
However, UNIDROIT has elaborated an international code in which
general principles of contract law specifically adapted for nonnational transactions have been compounded. 4 Paradoxically, this
Institute aimed at conventional unification of law 5 has carried out the
work of scientific unification of transnational commercial law,
something never tried before.
Today, every reader of the imposing legal literature on the
UNIDROIT Principles is confronted by a phenomenon which has
reunited international, private, and comparative law scholars in
common reflection, and has torn down the common state-centered

must mean the law unanimously adopted by all countries engaged upon
Such a claim would have been sustainable two
international commerce ....
centuries ago. But the international business community is now immeasurably
enlarged. What principles of trade law, apart from those which are so general as
to be useless, are common to the legal systems of the members of such a
Community?
Andrea Giardina, La lex mercatoria et la sdcurit du commerce et des investissements
internationaux,in HOMMAGE A FRANCOIS RIGAUX 223 (1993); F. De Castro, El arbitraje
y la nueva "Lex mercatoria", 4 A.D.C. 619 (1979); J.M. Gondra, La moderna Lex
mercatoriay la unificacion del derecho del comercio internacional,REV. DE DERECHO
MERCANTIL 738 (1973); DERECHO DEL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 46 (J. Fernandez
Rozas ed., 1996); Gilberlo I. Boutin, Autour de la reception de la lex mercatoriaen droit
positif panameen: Developpement historique et definition d'un jus mercatorum au
Panama, RDU/ULR 305, 305-11, nn.2-3 (1998); M. Virgos Soriano, Lex mercatoria, in
DICCIONARIO JURIDICO 3993-94 (1997); Joachim Mertens, Lex mercatoria, A Selfapplied System Beyond National Law?, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 37 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1997); PIERRE MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIViE 465 n.702 (5th ed.
1994).
It is clear that the UNIDROIT Principles are not an international
4.
convention, nor an international organization resolution. They are basically a
restatement of international contract law which represents rules common to the world
market.
See generally, e.g., R. Monaco, Istituto Internazionaleper l'Unificazione del
5.
dirittoprivato, in ENC. GIUR. TRECCANI (1988).
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partitions of legal science, at least in continental Europe.6 A leading
Italian scholar has warned that we might face a turning point in the
legal thinking of international trade:
[T]he effectiveness of this new Digest relies on the ongoing number of
international arbitral awards that, in resolving disputes by applying lex
mercatoria, make textual reference to the UNIDROIT principles,
assuming them to be a credited source. The essence of this compilation
resides in the blend of contractual practice with universally accepted
general principles of law. Here, the political mediation of competing
interests, peculiar to the law created by States is replaced, just like in
the ancient times of lex mercatoria, by the cultural mediation of legal
7
scholars.

Further evidence of the growing importance of lex mercatoria
and the UNIDROIT Principles is offered in the European Commission
green paper "on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on
the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community
instrument and its modernisation." In Europe, it is now time to
transform the 1980 Rome Convention into an E.C. regulation, and the
Commission has pointed out that "traditionally, most academic
writers have ruled out the possibility of choosing non-state rules,
particularly because there is not yet a full and consistent body of such
rules." However, in 2003 the situation seems different from the one
prevailing in 1980. The hundreds of scholars throughout the world
who repeat that lex mercatoria(and the UNIDROIT Principles) does
not exist, or worse, is not applied to international contracts, risk to be
outdated.
Hence, the European Commission suggests a modification of
Article 3 of the Rome Convention (on choice of law by the parties) to
encompass a choice of transnational rules. Such a modification is
necessary because:
[I]t is common practice in international trade for the parties to refer not
to the law of one or other state but direct to the rules of an
international convention such as the Vienna Convention of 11 April
1980 on contracts for the international sale of goods, to the customs of
international trade, to the general principles of law, to the lex
mercatoria or to recent private codifications such as the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 9

The present analysis aims to build up some models of application of
transnational rules, including the UNIDROIT Principles, on the basis
of patterns observed in arbitral jurisprudence. This will help to

6.
For an extensive bibliography, see http://www.unilex.info.
7.
Translated from Francesco Galgano, Diritto ed economia alle soglie del
nuovo millennio, in 1 CONTRAlTO E IMPREsA 205 (2000).
8.
European Commission, Green Paper, On the Conversion of the Rome
Convention of 1980 into a Community Instrument and Its Modernisation, 654 (Jan. 14,
2003) (on file with author).
9.
Id. at 22.
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estimate, in a more accurate way, the role of these rules in the
development of international commercial arbitration law at the dawn
of the third millennium.' 0
Since their official presentation in May 1994, the UNIDROIT
Principles on international commercial contracts have received
various applications, either in the framework of institutional
arbitration, or in the context of ad hoc arbitration." The importance
of ICC institutional arbitration leads one to focus the present study
on patterns of international jurisprudence rendered in that specific
framework. In this respect, a recent study on those awards has shown
that the UNIDROIT Principles on international commercial contracts
have been applied in at least 38 awards in the period comprising May
1994 to December 31, 2000.12
The preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles states that these
rules become applicable: "[w]hen the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by them. They may be applied when the parties
have agreed that their contract be governed by 'general principles of
law,' the 'lex mercatoria'or the like." Moreover, "they may provide a
solution to an issue raised when it proves impossible to establish the
relevant rule of the applicable law. They may be used to interpret or
supplement international uniform law instruments. They may serve
13
as a model for national and international legislators."'

10.
See generally STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE
SALIENT PROBLEMS (1987); John J. BARCELO III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1999); MICHAEL
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES
ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (1997); ALAN REDFERN &
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (3d
ed. 1999); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); H. Grigera Naon, Choice
of Law Problems in InternationalCommercial Arbitration,289 R.C.A.D.I. 9 (2001).
11.
See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational
Law, 5 RDU/ULR 1 (2001).
12.
See Fabrizio Marrella & Fabian G6linas, The UNIDROIT Principles for
InternationalCommercial Contracts in ICC Arbitration, 10 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL.

26 (1999); Fabrizio Marrella & Fabian G6linas, Principes UNIDROIT relatifs aux
contrats du commerce international dans l'arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce
International,10 BULLETIN DE LA COUR INT'L D'ARBITRAGE DE LA CCI 26 (1999) (French

version). On the latest applications, see FABRIZIO MARRELLA, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ICC ARBITRATION (1999-2001) 49-115

(2002).
13.

The official comment to the UNIDROIT Principles states:

The Principles set forth general rules
'international commercial contracts.'

which are basically conceived for

1. "International" contracts
The international character of a contract may be defined in a great variety of
way. The solutions adopted in both national and international legislation range
from a reference to the place of business or habitual residence of the parties in
different countries to the adoption of more general criteria such as the contract
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having "significant connections with more than one State," "involving a choice
between the laws of different States," or "affecting the interests of international
trade."
The Principles do not expressly lay down any of these criteria. The assumption,
however, is that the concept of "international" contracts should be given the
broadest possible interpretation, so as ultimately to exclude only those
situations where no international element at all is involved, i.e. where all the
relevant elements of the contract in question are connected with one country
only.
2. "Commercial" contracts
The restriction to "commercial" contracts is in no way intended to take over the
distinction traditionally made in some legal systems between "civil" and
"commercial" parties and/or transactions, i.e. to make the application of the
Principles dependent on whether the parties have the formal status of
"merchants" (commercants, Kaufleute) and/or the transaction is commercial in
nature. The idea is rather that of excluding from the scope of the Principles socalled "consumer transactions" which are within the various legal systems
being increasingly subjected to special rules, mostly of a mandatory character,
aimed at protecting the consumer, i.e. a party who enters into the contract
otherwise than in the course of its trade or profession. The criteria adopted at
both national and international level also vary with respect to the distinction
between consumer and non-consumer contract. The Principles do not provide
any express definition, but the assumption is that the concept of "commercial"
contracts should be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as to include
not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services, but
also other types of economic transactions, such as investment and/or concession
agreements, contracts for professional services, etc.
3. The Principles and domestic contracts between private persons
Notwithstanding the fact that the Principles are conceived for international
commercial contracts, there is nothing to prevent private persons from agreeing
to apply the Principles to a purely domestic contract. Any such agreement
would however be subject to the mandatory rules of the domestic law governing
the contract.
4. The Principles as rules of law governing the contract
a. Express choice by the parties
As the Principles represent a system of rules of contract law which are common
to existing national legal systems or best adapted to the special requirements of
international commercial transactions, there might be good reasons for the
parties to choose them expressly as the rules applicable to their contract, in the
place of one or another particular domestic law.
Parties who wish to adopt the Principles as the rules applicable to their
contract would however be well advised to combine the reference to the
Principles with an arbitration agreement.
The reason for this is that the freedom of choice of the parties in designating
the law governing their contract is traditionally limited to national law.
Therefore, a reference by the parties to the Principles will normally be
considered to be a mere agreement to incorporate them in the contract, while
the law governing the contract will still have to be determined on the basis of
the private international law rules of the forum. As a result, the Principles will
bind the parties only to the extent that they do not affect the rules of the
applicable law from which the parties may not derogate.
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The situation may be different if the parties agree to submit disputes arising
from their contract to arbitration. Arbitrators are not necessarily bound by a
particular domestic law. This is self-evident if they are authorised by the
parties to act as amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono. But even in the
absence of such an authorisation there is a growing tendency to permit the
parties to choose "rules of law" other than national laws on which the
arbitrators are to base their decision. See in particular Article 28(1) of the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; see also 1965
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States art. 42(1) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
In line with this approach, the parties would be free to choose the Principles as
the "rules of law" according to which the arbitrators would decide the dispute,
with the result that the Principles would apply to the exclusion of any
particular national law, subject only to the application of those rules of
domestic law which are mandatory irrespective of which law governs the
contract (see Art. 1.4). In disputes falling under the ICSID Convention, the
Principles might even be applicable to the exclusion of any domestic rule of law.
b. The Principlesapplied as lex mercatoria
Parties to international commercial contracts who cannot agree on the choice of
a particular domestic law as the law applicable to their contract sometimes
provide that it shall be governed by the "general principles of law," by the
"usages and customs of international trade", by the lex mercatoria, etc.
Hitherto, such reference by the parties to not better identified principles and
rules of a supranational or transnational character has been criticised, among
other grounds, because of the extreme vagueness of such concept. In order to
avoid, or at least considerably to reduce, the uncertainty accompanying the use
of such vague concepts for the determination of their content, it might be
advisable to have recourse to a systematic and well-defined set of rules such as
the Principle.
5. The Principles as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise
applicable
The Principles may however become relevant even where the contract is
governed by a particular domestic law. This is the case whenever it proves
extremely difficult if not impossible to establish the relevant rule of that
particular domestic law with respect to a specific issue and a solution can be
found in the Principle. The reasons for such a difficulty generally lie in the
special character of the legal sources and/or the cost of access to them.
Recourse to the Principles as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise
applicable is of course to be seen as a last resort; on the other hand it may be
justified not only in the event of the absolute impossibility of establishing the
relevant rule of the applicable law, but also whenever the research involved
would entail disproportionate efforts and/or cost. The current practice of courts
in such situations is that of applying the lex fori. Recourse to the Principles
would have the advantage of avoiding the application of a law which will in
most cases be more familiar to one of the partie.
6. The Principles as a means of interpreting and supplementing
existing international instruments
Any legislation, whether of international or national origin, raises questions
concerning the precise meaning of its individual provision. Moreover, such
legislation is by its very nature unable to anticipate all the problems to which it
will be applied. When applying domestic statutes it is possible to rely on long
established principles and criteria of interpretation to be found within each
legal system. The situation is far more uncertain with respect to instruments
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The issue of choice of law in international arbitration has long
been debated in specialized private international law literature by
international commercial arbitration scholars. 14 Today, there is little

which, although formally incorporated into the various national legal systems,
have been prepared and agreed upon at international level.
According to the traditional view recourse should, even in such cases, be had to
the principles and criteria provided in domestic law, be it the law of the forum
or that which would, according to the relevant rules of private international
law, be applicable in the absence of the uniform law.
At present, both courts and arbitral tribunals tend more and more to abandon
such a "conflictual" method and seek instead to interpret and supplement
international instruments by reference to autonomous and internationally
uniform principle. This approach, which has indeed been expressly sanctioned
in the most recent conventions (see, e.g., Art. 7 of the 1980 UN Convention on

Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)), is based on the
assumption that uniform law, even after its incorporation into the various
national legal systems, only formally becomes an integrated part of the latter,
whereas from a substantive point of view it does not lose its original character
of a special body of law autonomously developed at international level and
intended to be applied in a uniform manner throughout the world. Until now,
such autonomous principles and criteria for the interpretation and
supplementing of international instruments have had to be found in each single
case by the judges and arbitrators themselves on the basis of a comparative
survey of the solutions adopted in the different national legal system. The
Principles could considerably facilitate their task in this respect.
7. The Principles as a model for national and international legislators
In view of their intrinsic merits the Principles may in addition serve as a model
to national and international law-makers for the drafting of legislation in the
field of general contract law or with respect to special types of transaction. At a
national level, the Principles may be particularly useful to those countries
which lack a developed body of legal rules relating to contracts and which
intend to update their law, at least with respect to foreign economic
relationships, to current international standard. Not too different is the
situation of those countries with a well-defined legal system, but which after
the recent dramatic changes in their socio-political structure have an urgent
need to rewrite their laws, in particular those relating to economic and
business activities.
At an international level the Principles could become an important term of
reference for the drafting of conventions and model law.
So far the terminology used to express the same concept differs considerably
from one instrument to another, with the obvious risk of misunderstandings
and misinterpretation. Such inconsistencies could be avoided if the terminology
of the Principles were to be adopted as an international uniform glossary.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, cmts. 1-7; see generally Marrella & G6linas, 10
ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL., supra note 10.
14.
See generally P. NYGH, CHOICE OF FORUM AND LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1997); M. Pryles, Choice of Law Issues in International
Arbitration,63 ARB. 200 (1997); PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE
LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 380-590 (Albert Jan van den Berg
ed., 1996); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITE
DE L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 783-895 (1996); NAON H. GRIGERA,
CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1991);

Berthold Goldman, Les conflits de lois dans larbitrageinternational de droit privg, II
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doubt that arbitrators are, to a large extent, free from the constraints
imposed by conflict-of-law rules of the seat of the arbitration, the lex
situs arbitri.
Conversely, if an international arbitrator opposes the rules of the
lex situs arbitri,it follows that the arbitrator will face more complex

R.C.A.D.I., 351, 351-483, tbl. 109 (1963); Berthold Goldman, Frontiresdu droit et lex
mercatoria, supra note 3; Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et
l'arbitrageinternational:rdalitg et perspectives, 106 J. DU DROIT INT'L 475, 481 (1979);
Berthold Goldman, La volonti des parties et le r6le de l'arbitrage dans l'arbitrage
international,1981 REV. ARB. 469; Berthold Goldman, Une bataillejudiciaireautour de
la lex mercatoria. L'affaire Norsolor, 1983 REV. ARB. 379; Berthold Goldman, V
Arbitrage en droit internationalpriv6, in ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ-DROIT INTERNATIONAL
(1989); Berthold Goldman, Instance judiciaire et instance arbitrale internationale,in
ETUDES BELLET 219; S.R. Shackleton, The Applicable Law in InternationalArbitration
under the New English Arbitration Act 1996, 13 ARB. INT'L 375 (1997); Frederick
Alexander Mann, The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws, 36 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 437
(1987); Piero Bernardini, Contratti internazionalie diritto applicabile, 393 DIR. COMM.
INT. (1987); G. BERNINI, L'ARBITRATO DIRITTO INTERNO CONVENZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

347 (1993); JULIAN D.M. LEW, THE APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (1978); Yves Derains, La jurisprudence des arbitres du commerce
internationalen matiere de determinationdu droit applicable au contrat, 4 INT'L Bus.
L.J. 514, 514-30 (1996); Yves Derains, The ICC Arbitral Process Part VIII: Choice of the
Law Applicable to the Contract and International Arbitration, 6 ICC INT'L CT. ARB.
BULL. 10, 10-18 (1995); Yves Derains, Attente ldgitime des parties et droit applicable au
fond en mati~re d'arbitragecommercial international,in TRAVAUX DU COMITE FRANCAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 80-92 (1985); Philippe Kahn, A propos des sources du
droit du commerce international,supra note 3, at 185 (1991); C. Leben, Retour sur la
notion de contrat d'Etat et sur le droit applicable a celui-ci, in MELANGES OFFERTES A
HUBERT THIERRY 247-80 (1988); Hans Smit, Properchoice of law and the lex mercatoria
arbitralis, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW
MERCHANT 59-75 (1990); Riccardo Monaco, Le droit applicable au fond du litige dans la
Convention europdenne sur larbitrage, 9 NEDERLANDS
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 331 (1962); John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International
Arbitration: the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 278 (1981)
(for applications in US-Iran Claims Tribunal); John R. Crook, The Applicable Law in an
InternationalCommercial Arbitration:Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L
LAW. 613, 613-45 (1982); Campbell MacLachlan, Splitting the Proper Law in Private
International Law, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1990); L. Fumagealli, La legge
applicabile al merito della controversia nell' arbitratocommerciale internazionale,RIV.
DIR. INT. PRIV. E. PROC. 465 (1985); Mark Garavaglia, In Search of the ProperLaw in
Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29 (1991); T.C.
Hartley, Beyond the Proper Law: Mandatory Rules under Draft Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 4 EUR. L. REV. 236 (1979); K. Lionnet, Should
the Procedural Law Applicable to International Arbitration be Denationalised or
Unified? The Answer of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 8 J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1991); A.
Mebroukine, Le droit applicable aux contrats internationaux des entreprises publiques
economiques algeriennes: Tendances actuelles, 68 REV. DE DROIT INT'L ET DE DROIT
COMPARE 51 (1991); N. Parisi, Spunti in tema di clausola arbitrale nei contratti
internazionali alla luce della recente prassi italiana, DIR. COMMERCIALE INT'L 781
(1997); E. Spiro, Re-examination of the ProperLaw, in LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE;
D.R. Thomas, Commercial Arbitration: Arbitration Agreements as a Signpost of the
Proper Law, LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 141 (1984); Veijo Heiskanen, Theory and
Meaning of the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 4 FIN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 98, 98-129 (1993).
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issues than would be faced by domestic courts. In fact, sometimes the
obligation or the chance to apply the forum law by a domestic court is
a good excuse to avoid further research for the most appropriate rules
of law to resolve the disputes. International arbitrators, on the other
hand, do not have the chance to hide behind the simple application of
the forum law. They do not render the award in the name or on
behalf of the state in which the situs arbitri is located. Rather, their
decision is the result of a jurisdictional activity which finds its roots
in the parties' will. Thus, the international arbitrator is called to
realize a particular kind of multistate (or better transnational)justice
where conflict rules and the consequent determination of the proper
law of the contract should lead to the application of rules and general
principles of substantive law enjoying wide international consensus.15
The implication of the UNIDROIT Principles for contemporary
private international law applied to arbitration can be summarized
by referring to four issues: characterization, discussed in Section II;
preliminary questions, discussed in Section III; the concept of foreign
law, discussed in Section IV; and the relationship between foreign law
and state control mechanisms, discussed in Section V. All these issues
will be addressed with reference to institutional arbitration, leaving
aside specific problems of ad hoc arbitration.

II. ON CHARACTERIZATION
Whenever determining the applicable law, domestic courts and
even international arbitration tribunals may face problems of
characterization(or classification). 16 Despite different perceptions of

15.
See generally Rudolf B. Schlesinger & Herbert J. Giindisch, I principi
generali del diritto come norme oggettive nei procedimenti arbitrali.Un contributo alla
teoria della denazionalizzazione dei contratti, RIv. DIR. CIV. 311 (1997); Arthur T. von
Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 29
(1977); Luther L. McDougal 1II, "Private"InternationalLaw: Ius Gentium v. Choice of
Law or Approaches, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 (1990); FREIDRICH K. JUENGHER, CHOICE OF
LAW AND MULTI-STATE JUSTICE (1993); Ren6 David, Arbitrage et droit compar6, 11
REV. INT'L DE DROIT COMPARE 11 (1950); Berthold Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans
les contrats et les arbitrages internationaux, 106 J. DU DROIT INT'L 475, 481 (1979);
Emmanuel Gaillard, Trente ans de Lex Mercatoria. Pour une application selective des
principes gingraux du droit, 122 J. DU DROIT INT'L 5, 27 (1995). For contributions of
traditional conflict of laws scholars, see RONALD HARRY GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAW,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (7th ed. 1974); Jean George Sauveplanne, New
Trends in the Doctrineof Private InternationalLaw and their Impact on Court Practice,
II R.C.A.D.I. 78, 78-82, tbl. 175 (1982); Bernard Audit, Le caractire fonctionnel de la
r~gle de conflit, III R.C.A.D.I. 255, 256-58, tbl. 186.
16.
Kent Lipstein, International Arbitration Between Individuals and
Governments and the Conflicts of Law, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 182-89 (Bin Cheng & E. D. Brown eds., 1988); see also P. A.
Freund, Characterization with Respect to Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, in
LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 158-64 (Hessel
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this problem developed in U.S. and European doctrines, 17 there are
few doubts that it concerns a process of labeling legal issues by
deciding if they fall into the category of "contracts" or "torts," and if
they pertain to matters of "substance" or "procedure."' 8 Arbitral case
law has so far not offered sharp solutions to this classical problem
and pragmatism of arbitrators has been used to escape from these
complex issues.
Issues of characterization are, to private international law
scholars, of crucial importance. Since connecting factors are different
for each of the hereinabove mentioned categories, the applicable law
will change, modifying the outcome of the dispute. Different conflictof-law approaches in the world may invite a plaintiff to shop for the
forum that characterizes the issue in a manner leading to the
application of the law most favorable to them.
The arbitrator faces rare but peculiar characterization issues
both in positive choice-of-law cases and in absence of an express
choice-of-law provision by the parties, including situations in which
arbitral regulations allow the arbitrator to determine the proper law
of the contract by following "conflict of laws rules as [that arbitrator]
deems
appropriate."' 9
Classical
methods
for
resolving
characterization issues have been developed contemplating only
domestic courts and not arbitration tribunals. Domestic courts use
any of three criteria for characterization:
*

lege fori

"

lege causae

*

resort to general principles of law

The first technique, lege fori, is widely accepted in continental
20
Europe as it has been approved by scholars and applied by courts. It
clashes, however, with the contemporary
de-nationalization
movement of arbitral procedure. L'arbitre n'a pas de for, arbitrators

E. Yntema ed. 1949); see generally A.H. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERISATION IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940).
17.
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 119 (2000).

18.
A.E. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 268-73 (1990); Lawrence Craig,
William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, Choice of Substantive Law, in INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 283-92 (2d ed. 1990).

19.
See Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration,
1988, art. 13.3; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 42, 4 I.L.M. 532; U.N. Conventions
on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL) Rules of Arbitration, 1977, art. 33,
reprinted in 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 161 (1977); Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, 1985, art. 28(2); European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, May 16, 1961, art. VII, 484 U.N.T.S. 364. See generally B.P. v. Libya, 53
I.L.R. 326 (1979). In addition, if no valid and complete choice is found, the arbitrator
must resort to other conflict rules, requiring characterization of the matters in dispute
and determination of the proper law.
20.

See HENRI BATIFFOL, 1 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 240 (1974).
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do not have a forum state: they do not pronounce the words of law on
behalf of the state of the seat of the arbitration, but they render an
award because parties have requested them to do so. Further, this
technique may be of limited use whenever one has to characterize
certain international business transactions which are unknown under
domestic law (in Italy, courts have faced this problems on matters of
trusts and Anstalten, one-man corporations). 21 Under an arbitral
perspective, there are further peculiar problems which show the
inadequacy of characterization lege fori.
Two examples may help to illustrate the problem.
If an Italian arbitrator sitting in London has to decide an
international dispute between Swiss and Argentinean parties, with
Italian law as lex contractus why should the arbitrator characterize
issues according to English Law (lex situs arbitri)?A second example:
three arbitrators of different nationalities (Italian, Swiss and Arab)
sitting in Zurich, Switzerland have to decide a dispute between a U.S.
corporation and the Iranian Government. There is no choice of law,
and arbitrators finally decide to apply the UNIDROIT Principles as
lex contractus.22 Why should they characterize issues according to
Swiss Law?
Since characterization lege fori may not be the best tool for
international
arbitrators,
another
common
technique
is
characterization lege causae. The latter seems more adapted to
arbitration, but it clashes with academic writings. The strongest
objection is a logical one. Characterization is used to interpret choiceof-law rules, and characterization is necessary to determine the lex
causae. Since the end result of characterization is the lex causae, it is
nonsense to adopt the lex causae in order to determine itself.
With this problem, we face another turning point between
conflict-of-law analysis before domestic courts and international
arbitration tribunals. International arbitration scholars are naturally
oriented towards the theory according to which an issue should be
adjudicated by applying the specific law which the parties have
chosen, or which they can expect to be applied. By consulting the lex
causae, characterization issues seem to be consistent with parties'
expectations. 23 But, as explained below, the lex causae may be a state
legal system or the anational legal system, namely, lex mercatoriaor

21.
Now the reform of corporate law is oriented towards recognizing the full
validity of corporations with only one stockholder. Before the reform, since a
corporation is a contract, it seemed simply paradoxical to contract with oneself; on the
other hand the creation of a legal entity from one physical person was perceived as a
means to escape civil and tax liabilities.
22.
See ICC Award No. 7375, 11 ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 37 (2001).
23.
The paradox underlying this method consists in observing that the
interpretation of the conflict of laws rule leading to the lex causae requires prior
characterization.
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the UNIDROIT Principles. In the latter case, the UNIDROIT
Principles will serve for characterization purposes. Therefore, the
second technique, though apparently irrational, seems to be more
suited for transnational arbitration. This said, a third technique
might perhaps be the best solution to this puzzle.
Recourse to general principles of private law for characterization
purposes is ancient only in academic writings and found its strongest
advocate in Ernst Rabel, a German scholar who also taught at the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. More than thirty years ago, Rabel
pleaded for a characterization technique based on general principles
of law, but his voice remained unheard. The period in which he stated
his theory was dominated by what the Belgian Franqois Rigaux has
called the "derive positiviste," 24 a movement of thinking that has
dominated domestic and international law under the intellectual
weight of scholars like Triepel in Germany, Anzilotti in Italy and, to a
certain extent, the Austrian Kelsen.
Currently, critiques of the vagueness of general principles of law
or, worse, attempts to give political meaning to them in North-South
new international economic order claims have been partially
overcome by the UNIDROIT Principles. Hence, the UNIDROIT
Principles currently represent a system of rules ready to be used by
arbitrators for characterization even if the applicable law to
substance to the dispute is a national legal system. UNIDROIT
principles are also available whenever the applicable law
encompasses international conventions, be they of uniform private
international law (i.e. 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to
contractual obligations or the Inter-American Convention on the law
applicable to international contracts) 25 or of uniform substantive law
(i.e. CISG, international factoring, international financial leasinge
etc.).26
In conclusion, the UNIDROIT Principles of international
commercial contracts seem to offer a viable solution for some
characterization issues in international commercial arbitration by
avoiding recourse to lex fori or lex causae and increasing, ipso facto,
predictability and certainty of legal solutions for transnational
economic disputes. As a matter of fact, the Principles define the scope
of contractual matters vis-&-vis tort issues. They also provide the key
to distinguish matters of substance from matters of procedure. The
question of characterizing the statute of limitations as a matter of
substance or procedure, a real nightmare even for the brightest
international arbitrators, has been resolved by the forthcoming

24.

See generally F. RIGAUX, MLANGES PHILIPPE KAHN (2000).

25.
Friedrich Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law applicableto
InternationalContracts:Some Highlights and Comparisons,42 A. J. COMP.L. 381, 38193 (1994).
26.
See Italian Private International Law No. 218, art. 2.2 (1995).
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UNIDROIT Principles, Part II. The second part of the Principles, to
be presented officially in 2004, includes the statute of limitations
among substantial issues meaning clearly that, under transnational
law, the statute of limitations is part of the rules of law applicable to
27
the merits.
III.

ON PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

Another field of possible application of the UNIDROIT Principles
is that of preliminary questions in international commercial
arbitration. As on matters of characterization, classical private
international law can be precious for arbitration scholars. An
example drawn from a very recent case will help in identifying the
issues at stake.2 8 A European bank had financed a series of export
sales contracts by Brazilian producers. In order to cover risk of
frustration of the export sales contracts, the same bank entered into
insurance contracts subject to French law, with a syndicate of
insurance companies. The insurance contract contained an
arbitration clause referring to ICC arbitration.
The Brazilian sellers failed to deliver the goods to the buyers
because of supervening adverse political events in Brazil.
Accordingly, the bank asked the insurers to pay the prize, but the
latter objected that the contract did not cover Governmental
measures in question. The bank started the arbitration procedure.
During litigation, the defendants pleaded that underlying export
sales contracts were not valid due to the absence of any
determination of the price. The arbitral tribunal, sitting in Paris, had
to face a true preliminary question since the determination of the
validity of the sales contract, a different contract from the one at
stake, became a crucial matter to resolve disputes in the latter.
The export sales contracts were silent as to the applicable law.
The arbitral tribunal relied, at first, on Brazilian law according to
which a sales contract was valid if the price was determinable, as it
was in the case at hand where the sugar had a market price. In order
to corroborate their decision, the arbitrators stated that sales
contracts without an express determination of the price may be valid
according to generally accepted principles in international trade as
shown by the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Article 55) and by the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Article

27.
Thus, it is neither part of the lex fori, nor of the lex situs arbitri, nor of the
lex loci executionis.
28.
See ICC Award No. 7819, 12 INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 56 (2001), available at
http://www.unilex.info.
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5.7).29 Here, the reference to the UNIDROIT Principles is welcomed
since they resolve a point which is unclear in CISG (which was not
applicable to the case), given the apparent contradiction between
Article 14 on formation of contracts (stating that offers should have a
fixed price or a price-fixing provision) and Article 55 on contracts
without any price provision.
In private international law, four techniques may be used to
solve preliminary questions. First, under the so-called disjunctive
method one may submit the preliminary question to the lex fori
regardless of what the lex contractus says. Again, this solution is
designed for a domestic court, but the arbitrator does not have a lex
fori, hence this technique is unhelpful. 30 A second option is to consult
conflict-of-law rules of the lex causae in order to resolve the
preliminary question. This method seems more adapted for
arbitration since it avoids conflict-of-law rules of the lex situs arbitri
and gives more weight to those pertaining to the law chosen by the
parties or designated by arbitrators taking into account parties'
expectations. 31 A third possibility is the conjunctive method. By this
technique, one may consider the preliminary question as absorbed
into the main issue in dispute. Hence, the applicable law both to the
preliminary and the principal question in dispute is the same: lex
causae. For the international arbitrator, the conjunctive method
remains a valuable one since it is easier to use and respectful of
parties' choices.
Third- millennium arbitrators will probably opt for this method,
but they will go beyond classical private international law, since lex
causae in arbitration can be national or anational. In the latter case,
if lex contractus are the UNIDROIT Principles or lex mercatoria, the
preliminary question shall be resolved using the same anational
rules. It is then possible to appreciate the potential of a new method
of resolution of preliminary questions. Classical private international
law has pointed out that it is possible to have recourse to general
principles of law to resolve preliminary questions. Today, arbitrators
have at their disposal the UNIDROIT Principles, a codification of

29.
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 55,
concluded at Vienna, Apr. 1, 1980, U.N. Doc.A/Conf. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 671 (1980) [hereinafter Vienna Sales Convention]; UNIDROIT Principles, supra
note 2, art. 5.7.
30.
Accordingly, had the arbitrators in ICC Award No. 7819 used the
disjunctive method they would have solved the preliminary question of the validity of
the sale contract according to French Law, the lex situs arbitri. Hence, the contract
would have been considered invalid, since French law does not seem to admit a
contract of sale without indication of the price.
31.
Following the example, arbitrators should have considered Article 13 of the
1988 ICC regulation. Since French law is the lex contractus, French conflict of laws
rules would have led to the application to the preliminary question of the law of the
seller, namely Brazilian law.
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such principles specially adapted for transnational contracts.
Arbitrators may use UNIDROIT Principles as a tool for resolving
preliminary questions, as an alternative means to localization
32
techniques.

IV.

ON CHOICE OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE

A. Models of Choice
Often, in institutional arbitration, arbitral regulations will
indicate to the arbitrator the path to follow in order to determine the
law applicable to the substance of the dispute. This consideration
applies in particular to ICC arbitration where Article 17 of the 1998
regulations, states the following:
Applicable Rules of Law
1. The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be
applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the
absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the
rules of law that it determines to be appropriate.
2.
In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the
provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages.
3.
The Arbitral Tribunal shall assume the powers of an amiable
compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties have agreed to
33
give it such powers

This formula allows either the parties or the arbitrators to
choose, inter alia, the UNIDROIT Principles as a lex contractus
without passing through any domestic conflict-of-law rules.3 4 Similar
formulas may be found in other leading arbitration rules such as
Article 28, Paragraph 1 of the 1997 AAA International Arbitration

32.
In Award No. 7819, arbitrators have made reference to the UNIDROIT
Principles among other rules (CISG and Brazilian Law). By using the fourth method it
would have sufficed to make reference to Article 5.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles,
reaching the same result as did the arbitrators in the actual case.
33.
ICC Publication 808, available at http://www.iccarbitration.org (last visited
Sept. 18, 2003).
34.
See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON,
ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE 1998 ICC ARBITRATION RULES 111-12 (1998); YVES DERAINS
& ERIC SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 217 (1998); Yves

Derains, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part VIII: Choice of the Law Applicable to the
Contract and InternationalArbitration, 6 BULLETIN DE LA COUR INT'L D'ARBITRAGE DE
LA CCI 10 (1995); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN,
TRAITE DE L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 814 (1996); Marc Blessing,
Keynotes on Arbitral Decisionmaking, BULLETIN DE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL
D'ARBITRAGE DE LA CCI 44 (1997); Marc Blessing, Choice of Substantive Law in

Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 39, 39-65 (1997); Marc Blessing, Regulations in
Arbitration Rules on Choice of Law, in THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 391 (1996); HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, A CHART COMPARING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE ICC (1998).
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Rules, 35 Article 22.3 of the 1998 LCIA Arbitration Rules,
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or Article

59 of the 1994 World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration
37
Regulations.
Since the most striking event in third millennium international
commercial arbitrations is the growing application of anational rules,
this section will focus on use of the UNIDROIT Principles of
international commercial contracts. The role of transnational rules in
international commercial arbitration may be fully enjoyed with
reference to models of choice of law. In order to highlight the model of
reasoning for choice of substantive law (almost spontaneously) used
by international arbitrators, it is important to draw a distinction
between cases in which parties made an express positive reference to
lex contractus and those in which no such choice was made. In the
latter case, the choice was made by the arbitrators, pursuant to
Article 17 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 1998 or Article 13 of the
former (1988) version of the Rules.
Thus beyond the "innocent" formula contained in Article 17 of
ICC regulations lie the following situations:

0

Express choices (positive or negative)

35.
AAA International Arbitriation Rules (1994), available at http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Documents/RPID%20Documents/rp04049.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003). According to Article 28, paragraph 1:
The tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law designated by
the parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such a designation by the
parties, the tribunal shall apply such law(s) or rules of laws as it determines to
be appropriate.
36.
LCIA Arbitration Rules, (1998) available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
lcia.arbitration.rules.1998 (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). According to Article 22,
paragraph 3:
The arbitral tribunal shall decide the parties'dispute in accordance with the
law(s) or rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the merits of their
dispute. If and to the extent that the Arbitral Tribunal determines that the
parties have made no such choice, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law(s)
or rules of law which it considers appropriate.
37.
WIPO Arbitration Rules, WIPO Pub. No. 446(E) (1994). According to
Article 59, Section a:
The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with the law or rules of law
chosen by the parties. Any designation of the law of a given State shall be
construed, unless otherwise express, as directly referring to the substantive
law of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules. Failing a choice by the
parties, the Tribunal shall apply the law or rules of law that it determines to be
appropriate. In all cases the Tribunal shall decide having due regard to the
terms of any relevant contract and taking into account applicable trade usages.
On the application of transnational rules in international commercial arbitration, see
the Resolution adopted by International Law Association in Cairo on April 26, 1992.
TRANSNATIONAL

RULES

Bernardini ed., 1993).
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*

Absence of any choice of law
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It is well established in arbitration literature that parties may
choose the law (or rules of law in most modern, widely used
arbitration regulations) applicable to their contract. Increasingly, the
realm of party autonomy is expanding such that it can encompass
situations in which the object of choice is a national legal system or
an anational legal system like lex mercatoria and UNIDROIT
Principles. All these choices of lex contractus may be labeled as
positive choices since parties declare in their contract, or during
proceedings, what law or rules of law they want arbitrators to apply
in order to resolve the dispute.
From the standpoint of the private international lawyer, the
UNIDROIT Principles represent a new kind of foreign law. By this
term, conflict of law scholars refer to a law which is foreign vis-A-vis
forum law and that may be applied by a court once conflict of law
rules have been activated. For the same reason, in some
jurisdictions-but not in Italy after Article 14 of the new PIL--foreign
law must be proved by the party claiming its application, since iura
novit curia is limited to domestic law. Domestic courts may be
reluctant to apply a law they do not know and here we touch upon
another turning point between state courts and international
arbitrators methods.
For international arbitrators there is no foreign law since they do
not have a forum law. For them everything is transnational. The
UNIDROIT Principles (with lex mercatoria) may now be considered
as a sort of default law. 38 While domestic courts shall have a natural
inclination to resort to national law, the arbitrator can apply the
UNIDROIT Principles and thus increase the predictability of legal
solutions. The Principles are increasingly known by transnational
economic operators (and their lawyers) and they may be reasonably
known just by consulting the UNIDROIT website for free.
Such positive choices might not need to be expressed in a
contract because they could be considered as implied terms in it. This
would follow a pattern which has been identified by Article 3,
Paragraph 1 of 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to
39
contractual obligations.

38.
This point seems to be admitted by Professor Pierre Mayer. See Pierre
Mayer, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitration Practice, in ICCUNIDROIT, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERICAL CONTRACTS 117
(2001).
39.
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980
O.J. (L 266) 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1497 (1980). Article 3 states:
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must
be express or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the
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Beyond the horizon of positive (express or implied) choices of law,
we enter the land of negative choices. Negative choices happen when
parties decide that they simply do not want the application of one or
more laws to the merits of their dispute. This seems to occur in state
contracts where none of the parties accept the application of the other
contractor's law. Thus, as a mirror to positive choices, arbitrators
may face negative express or implied choices of law. In these
situations, arbitrators shall have to determine the applicable law to
substance by respecting fully the negative will of parties of avoiding
the application of certain legal systems, be they national or anational.
The final chapter is the absence of choice of law applicable to
substance. In this situation, most modern arbitration rules, following
the model of article 17, mentioned above, allow the arbitrators to
apply the rules of law they deem to be the most appropriate to the
issue. Does that mean to apply the lex situs arbitrito the substance of
the dispute? The answer, of course, is no. The arbitrators today have
at their disposal a good stock of legal instruments. They can have
recourse to classical conflict of laws analysis, to general principles of
private international law or-and that is the new entry for third
millennium arbitrations-to the UNIDROIT Principles.
Our research in ICC arbitration awards has suggested that this
40
seems to be more characteristic of very large economic arbitrations
than of smaller ones, which consistently prefer a traditional approach
based on conflict of (national) laws. Moreover, the application of
UNIDROIT Principles in cases where a positive choice of law is
absent seems to be more in line with parties' legitimate
expectations. 4 1 Provided that arbitrators ascertain, on a case by case
basis, that UNIDROIT Principles are the most appropriate rules to
resolve transnational disputes, there is no doubt that the latter will
offer a new chapter of arbitration law for third-millennium scholars
and practitioners.
In conclusion, the UNIDROIT Principles may be applied by
arbitrators:
*

As a positive (express or implied) choice of law from the parties;

*

As a result of a negative choice of law analysis;

*

As a neutral law or default law in case of absence of a choice of law
by the parties

contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select
the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.
Id. art. 3.
40.
See ICC Award No. 9797 (where the amount in dispute was more than ten
billion dollars).
See Yves Derains, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International
41.
Commercial Arbitration: A European Perspective, in ICC-UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 14 (2002).
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B. The UNIDROIT Principlesin Action
Once the role of the UNIDROIT Principles has been appreciated
under a theoretical approach, their actual application in
transnational economic arbitration can be discussed. Since their
official presentation in May 1994, the UNIDROIT Principles have
resulted in various applications, even in the context of the wellknown "old" formula contained in Article 13 of ICC regulations
referring to "appropriate conflict of law rules. ' 42 ICC arbitral practice
has shown that the UNIDROIT Principles have been applied
essentially in three contexts: as a lex contractus, as a means of
interpretation and supplementation of international uniform law
instruments, and, finally, as a means of interpretation or
supplementation of a domestic lex contractus. A final solution is to
exclude, in some cases, the application of the UNIDROIT Principles.
1. UNIDROIT Principles as a Lex Contractus
The UNIDROIT Principles have been applied as a lex contractus
in at least 12 ICC cases out of a total of 38 awards making reference
to the Principles (collected between May 1994 and December 31,
2000) meaning approximately 32 percent of ICC awards on
UNIDROIT Principles. 43 The applications of the Principles have been
grounded on the rule contained in Article 13 then in force and,
subsequently, in Article 17 of the 1998 ICC regulations. In those
awards, the Principles have been applied mostly in cases
characterized by the absence of a choice of law by the parties. One
could infer that they have been mainly taken into consideration by
arbitrators as a useful tool for dispute resolution. It is worth noting
the Principles have not just been applied by members of the
UNIDROIT working group. On the contrary, when that situation has
occurred, arbitrators excluded the application of the Principles
despite the formal request of one of the parties.
In some awards, arbitral tribunals have also found that the
absence of a positive choice of the applicable law in the contract must
be interpreted by taking into consideration the negative implicit will
of each of the parties to avoid the application of the other parties'
domestic law. This may lead to connecting the contract to a third
legal system be it a state legal system or the anational one. In the
first instance, it is necessary to find, inside the legal relationship at
issue, sufficient contacts to a particular state. The second instance
comes about when it is not easy to find evidence of a significant

See Marrella & Gelinas, supranote 2, at 26-119.
42.
43.
Other examples of this approach may be found in ICC Awards Nos. 7110,
7375, 8261, 8331, 8874, 8501, 8502, 8503. See id.
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connection to a third state domestic legal system. In this case, the
hypothesis of lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT Principles in
particular, becomes reality. Accordingly, the UNIDROIT Principles
have been elected via this reasoning by recognizing them as an
organic and reconstituted set of principles and rules common to major
world legal systems, in tune with the particular needs of
international commerce. Two examples serve to clarify this issue.
2. Positive Choice of Law by the Parties: ICC Award Number 7110
The first and most important example of such an approach has
been offered by ICC Award Number 7110. In that case, a state party
and a British private contractor entered into a number of contracts
covering the sale, supply, modification, maintenance, and operation of
equipment including support services. Most of the contracts did not
contain any choice-of-law clause and some of them referred to
"principles of natural justice." The arbitrators, in a partial award,
started their reasoning by analyzing elements leading to implicit
choice-of-law stipulations. Six out of nine contracts contained the
expressions "natural justice," "laws of natural justice," and "rules of
natural justice," in association with the resolution of disputes through
arbitration. According to the Tribunal:
It is clear then that the presence of the expressions 'natural justice,'
'laws of natural justice,' and 'rules of natural justice,' which were
undoubtedly the subject of careful consideration and negotiation, may
not be ignored for assessing if and to which extent the parties have
indicated the laws or principles governing the Contracts. However, to
elucidate their meaning it would be inappropriate to have recourse, in
bootstrap fashion, exclusively to the legal notions of one of the national
juristic systems, the application of which is at stake. The fact that the
Contracts are drafted in English is not decisive, since the English
language has become an international tool for expressing the terms and
conditions of sophisticated transactions, even between parties none of
which is a national of an English speaking country or entering into
transactions wholly unconnected with any such country. Resorting to
English when it comes to exteriorizing in black and white the substance
of a deal does not necessarily imply espousing the technical meaning
that a specific common law jurisdiction would ascribe to the terms
utilized.

44

Yet arbitrators were faced with the issue of characterizing
"natural justice" since the determination of the procedural or
substantive nature of such an expression would have had an impact
on the choice-of-laws process. The arbitrators believed that a general
principle of interpretation "widely accepted by national legal systems
and by the practice of international tribunals" suggests that in case of

44.
7110).

See Marrella & G6linas, supra note 2, at 43-44 (discussing ICC Award No.
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doubt or ambiguity, contractual clauses should be interpreted against
the drafting party. However, the tribunal added what follows:
On the other hand, the meaning to be ascribed to expressions contained
in international transactions ah initio submitted to international
commercial arbitration should be consistent with the nature and
expected role of the dispute-resolution method chosen by the parties
and the concomitant impact of such choice not only on procedural
aspects but also on the law governing the merits.
Finally, it is also a generally accepted practice by international
arbitral tribunals, predicated upon elementary notions of coherence and
rationality, to assume that the same words or expressions shall have
the same meaning throughout the documents containing them ....45

The special character of arbitral justice is revealed with the
following words:
In international commercial arbitration, though it is imaginable that the
term 'justice' may be utilized only in the sense of procedural justice, i.e. due
process and fair trial, it is commonly understood as referring to arbitral
justice in a more comprehensive sense, including not only arbitral
procedural fairness but also the type of solution regarding the merits-not
necessarily the same that would be obtained from national courts-that
should be expected by the parties by the very fact of having chosen
international commercial arbitration for resolving their contractual
disputes. Thus, it is not infrequently stated that often, the parties resort to
arbitration in order to have access to a 'justice' other than that which would
be obtained by applying a 'national law,' particularly when, on account of
the discrete circumstances of the case, a national law would not be adapted
to the solution of the dispute at stake .... An obvious confirmation that
notions of justice in international commercial arbitration are not merely
procedural but are also substantive is that the majority of national statutes
dealing with international arbitration, international conventions regarding
arbitration not just concerned with the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral agreements and awards, and arbitration rules contain procedural
provisions and choice-of-law provisions, i.e. provisions pointing to choice-oflaw solutions only become relevant because the dispute has been submitted
to international commercial arbitration and which may well differ from
those that would have been otherwise obtained had the decision of the case
46
been left to municipal courts and their private international law systems.

Developing the concept of substantive justice, arbitrators
reached the conclusion that the specific case at issue was denoted by
the exclusion of the choice-of-law criteria normally applicable by
domestic courts. Their conclusion was to resort to general principles
of law "which may be only defined in the negative as such rules and
principles not exclusively belonging to a single national legal system."
After a thorough reasoning "the Tribunal conclude[d] that the
reasonable intention of the parties regarding the substantive law
applicable to the Contracts was to have all of them governed by
general legal rules and principles in matter of international

45.
46.

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
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contractual obligations such as those arising out of the contracts,
which, though not necessarily enshrined in any specific anational
legal system, are specially adapted to the needs of international
transactions like the Contracts and enjoy wide international
consensus." 47 Combining the above considerations "without prejudice
to taking into account the provisions of the Contracts and relevant
trade usages, this Tribunal finds that the Contracts are governed by,
and should be interpreted in accordance [with], the UNIDROIT
Principles with respect to all matters falling within the scope of such
Principles, and for all other matters, by such other general legal rules
contractual obligations
and principles applicable to international
48
enjoying wide international consensus."
The arbitrators felt that they had to offer further justifications
for their choice and accordingly they listed the following reasons:
1) the UNIDROIT Principles are a restatement of international legal
principles applicable to international commercial contracts made by a
distinguished group of international experts coming from all prevailing
systems of the world, without the intervention of states or
governments, both circumstances redounding to the high quality and
neutrality of the product and its ability to reflect the present stage of
consensus on international legal rules and principles governing
international contractual obligation in the world, primarily on the basis
of their fairness and appropriateness for international commercial
transactions falling within their purview; 2) at the same time, the
UNIDROIT Principles are largely inspired [by] an international
uniform law text already enjoying wide international recognition and
generally considered as reflecting international trade usages and
practices in the field of the international sales of goods, which has
already been ratified by almost 40 countries, namely the 1980 Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods; 3) the UNIDROIT
Principles are specially adapted to the Contracts being the subject of
this arbitration, since they cover both the international sale of goods
and supply of services; 4) the UNIDROIT Principles (see their
Preamble) have been specifically conceived to apply to international
contracts in instances in which, as it is the case in these proceedings, it
has been found that the parties have agreed that their transactions
shall be governed by general legal rules and principles; and 5) rather
than vague principles or general guidelines, the UNIDROIT Principles
are mostly constituted by clearly enunciated and specific rules
49
coherently organized in a systematic way.

Id. at 48.
47.
Id. at 49.
48.
The arbitral tribunal referred to the following UNIDROIT Principles:
49.
Articles 1.7 (good faith and fair dealing in international trade), 2.4 (revocation of offer),
2.14 (contract with terms deliberately left open), 2.18 (written modification clause),
7.1.3 (withholding performance) and 7.4.8 (mitigation of harm). See UNIDROIT
Principles, supra note 2, arts. 1.7, 2.4, 2.14, 2.18, 7.1.3, 7.4.8.
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3. Negative Choices and Application of the UNIDROIT Principles by
Arbitrators: Award Number 7375
ICC Award Number 7375, rendered in Geneva on June 5, 1996,
is crucial to negative choice-of-law doctrine in international
commercial arbitration. 50 It provides an interesting example of cases
where a state, and not a private party, decides to commence
arbitration against a multinational corporation, which, in turn, tries
to resist by attacking the arbitrators' jurisdiction. In Award Number
7375, the Iranian government and the U.S. corporation Westinghouse
had signed a series of contracts for the supply of military radars to be
installed in Iran. The request for arbitration referred to the whole
series of contracts dealing with the delivery or installment or
maintenance of radar systems.
The arbitration clause was written in these terms:
All disputes arising out of or in relation to or in connection with this
agreement which cannot amicably be settled by discussion and mutual
accord, shall be finally settled by arbitration at Zurich, Switzerland, in
accordance with the rules then in effect of the International Chamber of
Commerce. Notice of arbitration shall be given to the party or parties to
whom demand therefore is addressed. Judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction or application may be made to such court for judicial
acceptance of the award and an order of enforcement, as the case may
be.

51

The initial issue to resolve was whether the plaintiff had
standing in order to claim on the basis of a contract that had been
signed between the (pre-revolution) Imperial Government of Iran and
Westinghouse. The tribunal found that the Ministry of Defense was
the successor in interest to the Imperial Government notwithstanding
the fact that the latter had been overthrown by the Iranian
revolution. Moreover, Westinghouse itself had argued this theory in
other cases when seeking damages from the Islamic Republic of Iran
and, therefore, as such the corporation was prevented to present this
argument under the light of a good faith criterion.
Westinghouse had argued that arbitration was not validly
instituted as the claimant had not obtained Parliamentary approval,
thereby violating the Iranian Constitution. The tribunal nonetheless
rejected the defendant's argument, inter alia, on the basis of Article
177 of the Swiss PIL. The defendant also argued that there was no
agreement to arbitrate on all contracts since only one contract
contained an arbitration agreement. The tribunal agreed with this
argument, rejecting the opposite argument presented by the claimant

50.
See ICC Award No. 7375, supra note 22. The integral publication of this
sentence makes it possible to analyze it without the usual limits of the confidentiality.
51.
Id.
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and aiming to extend arbitral jurisdiction on the basis of an alleged
course of dealing.
Once disputes concerning its jurisdiction had been resolved, the
arbitrators passed on to the determination of the applicable law. The
arbitrators noted that:
[I]n many international disputes, the question of the law which is
applicable is of rather peripheral or academic importance only, as the
dispute will be decided on the basis of the terms of the relevant contract
and, as far as necessary, an interpretation thereof, such that in most
cases it will not be necessary to resort to an underlying applicable law
'52
for obtaining "legal guidance."

None of the contracts contained a clause of choice of law and the
claimant argued that Iranian law should apply while the defendant
wanted Maryland law. The determination of the applicable law was
crucial for the solution of the case: under post-revolutionary Iranian
law, there is no time bar while under Maryland law, all of the Iranian
Government's claims are time-barred on the ground of the four-year
statute of limitations.
The arbitrators reported that Iran did not want the application
of another state law with these words:
To corroborate its argument, Claimant argues that the application of
general principles of law is particularly appropriate in connection with
State contracts and says that contracts having a highly political content
53
should be "denationalized" as far as possible.

Westinghouse, on the other hand, opposed in the strongest of terms
both to the application of Iranian law and to the application of
general principles of law. In its pleadings, Westinghouse argued that
it would not have agreed to enter into the contracts if they had to be
made under Iranian law and that it considered the applicable law as
Maryland law. In fact, Westinghouse had its place of business in
Maryland and it had to manufacture the goods that it was required to
supply there. Therefore, by virtue of general principles of
international private law, Maryland law was the law with the closest
connection to the case.
The tribunal pointed out that the applicable law could be found by
two methods, namely the objective and subjective methods. Under
the first method, the tribunal had to analyze the issue according to
the conflict-of-laws principles thereby determining Maryland law as
the applicable law to the case. However, the majority of arbitrators
considered this method insufficient to solve the case because it failed
to take into consideration the fact that the omission of a choice-of-law
provision was not an accident but was specifically wanted by parties.
In this case, none of the parties was willing to accept the law of the

52.
53.

Id.
Id.
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other parties to the contract. Hence a mechanical conflict
determination would result in an outcome that nobody wanted. On
this basis, the majority of arbitrators considered three possibilities:
*

To designate a neutral law as applicable;

*

To apply the tronc commun doctrine

*

To rely on general principles of international commercial law
including the UNIDROIT Principles.

The first solution was rejected insofar as there are no objective
connecting factors pointing towards the law of a third state. 54 The
second solution did not solve the problem since there is no tronc
commun, or common principles, between Maryland and Iranian law
precisely on the statute of limitations. The only method providing the
solution for this case may be the application of general contract law
principles and the lex mercatoria.
In this respect, arbitrators made an important statement. They
affirmed that lex mercatoriahas the function of safeguarding a kind
of negative interest of the two parties. Lex mercatoria presents the
advantage of protecting:
[B]oth Parties against the application of a national law which might
contain particular provisions which they had not expected, and which
may not be suitable in a truly international context of the present
nature. Freeing the parties from the constraints of a national law thus
would ascertain and warrant that the dispute shall be decided by
having regard to those rules of law and notions which deserve to be
qualified as being "generally accepted". Thus a decision based on
generally accepted principles has moreover the advantage to ascertain
55
foreseeability of the outcome and certainty of law.

The tribunal stressed the point that applying lex mercatoria is far
more difficult than applying a particular domestic law:
This is so because an arbitrator, who can simply apply a national law,
may not have to scrutinize and be concerned about the 'validity' and
'application-worthiness' of a particular provision; he may and will
simply apply the law (sometimes adding his own regrets: 'dura lex, sed
lex').
However, an arbitrator who has to reflect on those rules and
principles which truly deserve to be called 'general principles,' or
forming part of a lex mercatoria(thus being carried by an international
'communis opinio vel necessitatis'), will have a much more difficult and
56
responsible task to accomplish.

54.
Id. (arbitrators asking: "Why Swiss Law and not Japanese? The choice of
the situs of the arbitration (in casu Zurich/Switzerland) cannot in any way justify a
conclusion that the Parties had intended to subject themselves to the Swiss
substanntive [sic] Law").
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
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Therefore, the arbitral tribunal, by majority vote, 57 concluded that:
The tribunal will apply those general principles and rules of law
applicable to international contractual obligations which qualify as
rules of law and which have earned a wide acceptance and
international consensus in the international business community,
including notions which are said to form part of a Lex Mercatoria,also
taking into account any relevant trade usages as well as the
UNIDROIT Principles, as far as they can be considered to reflect
58
generally accepted principles and rules.

If UNIDROIT Principles and lex mercatoria have proven crucial to
solve the choice-of-law problem in these cases, one should note that
the former do not necessarily represent trade usages or international
practice. This is why their application shall always be carried out
59
cum judicio and after accurate analysis.
The end of the story was a mutually agreed solution out of court.
Yet, the arbitrators clearly pointed out in the award that the
principles of good faith in international business transactions
prevented Iran from suing Westinghouse a decade after the Iranian
revolution had cancelled any evidence defendant might have used for
the case at stake.

57.
A dissenting opinion was produced by the Iranian arbitrator pleading for
the application of Iranian law to the contract. The pleading, however, was based on
conceptions which nowadays are outdated. He basically affirmed that in state contracts
there is a presumption in favor of municipal law of the contracting state.
58.
Id.
59.
Among other examples of the same approach, it is worth to mention ICC
Awards nos. 8261 and 8502. In the first award, the dispute concerned a contract
between an Italian company and a Middle Eastern governmental agency. The contract
did not contain any choice-of-law clause. In a partial award on the question of the
applicable law, the arbitral tribunal decided that it would base its decision on the
"terms of the contract, supplemented by general principles of trade as embodied in the
lex mercatoria". Subsequently, it referred, with no further explanation, to Articles 4.6
(contra proferentem rule), 4.8 (supplying omitted terms), 7.4.1 (right to damages), 7.4.7
(harm due in part to aggrieved party) and 7.4.13 (agreed payment for non-performance)
of the UNIDROIT Principles, thereby implicitly considering the latter a source of the
lex mercatoria.See U.L.R. at 171 (1999). In ICC Award No. 8502, a French and a Dutch
buyers entered into a contract with a Vietnamese exporter for the supply of rice.
Claimants (the buyers) alleged that Respondent failed to supply the rice. The sales
contract contained an arbitration clause referring to ICC rules of arbitration.
Respondent refuses to take part in arbitration proceedings. The contract did not
contain any choice-of-law clause and the arbitral tribunal decided to base its award on
"trade usages and generally accepted principles of international trade. In particular
arbitrators applied the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods [hereinafter, Vienna Sales Convention] and to the UNIDROIT Principles, as
evidencing admitted practices under international trade law". See Marrella & G6linas,
supra note 2, at 73. By referring to Articles 76 of the CISG and 7.4.6 (proof of harm by
current price) of the UNIDROIT Principles, arbitrators reached the conclusion that
respondent was in breach of its obligations since no case of force majeure preventing
him from performing had occurred.
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C. Is Renvoi Really Phantomatic?
A final remark on matters of choice of law should be made on
renvoi. The UNIDROIT Principles, seen as part of an anational legal
system, do not contain conflict of laws rules. This character of the
UNIDROIT Principles seems to be in line with modern private
international law of contracts and with arbitral regulations. The
constant rule in modern instruments (see i.e. 1980 Rome Convention
on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Article 15) is
precisely that whenever there is election of the applicable law, be it
by the parties or by the arbitrators, this choice should be limited to
substantive rules, excluding conflict of law rules of the lex contractus.
Although the drafter of the UNIDROIT Principles had this situation
in mind, new problems are on the horizon as demonstrated by the
Arthur Andersen Award (ICC Award Number 9797).
In that case, the arbitrator resolved a global litigation by
referring to the UNIDROIT Principles and to the Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL).60 The former were further used to
establish a number of important conclusions such as: (a) the "member
firms' implicit obligation to cooperate and to pursue their professional
practice in accordance with the principles of good faith and fair
dealing inherent to international contracts;" 6 1 (b) party Z's duty of
best efforts "to ensure cooperation, coordination and compatibility
among the member firms' practices:" 62 (c) release of the parties from
their obligation to carry out and receive further performance, upon
termination of their contract; 63 and (d) the impossibility for party X to

60.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 4.1(1) ("A contract shall be
interpreted according to the common intention of the parties."); Principles of European
Contract Law [PECL], art. 5:101(1) ("A contract is to be interpreted according to the
common intention of the parties even if this differs from the literal meaning of the
word"); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 4.1(2) ("If such an intention cannot be
established, the contract shall be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable
persons of the same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstance.");
PECL, art. 5.101(3) ("If an intention cannot be established according to (1) or (2), the
contract is to be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the
same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstance").
61.
See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2 ("(1) Each party must act in
accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade, (2) The parties may
not exclude or limit this duty").
62.
See id. art. 5.4.2 ('To the extent that an obligation of a party involves a
duty of best efforts in the performance of an activity, that party is bound to make such
efforts as would be made by a reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstance").
63.
See id. art. 7.3.1(1) ("A party may terminate the contract where the failure
of the other party to perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a
fundamental non-performance"); id. art. 7.3.5(1) ('Termination of the contract releases
both parties from their obligation to effect and to receive future performance").
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claim full compensation as defined in Article 7.4.2 of the UNIDROIT
64
Principles.
This award illustrates how third-millennium arbitrations are
becoming increasingly affected by the multiplication of general
principles of contract law. In Award Number 9797, the arbitrator felt
it was necessary to refer to two sets of principles, which is in itself
striking as the case was a good example of global litigation, where the
UNIDROIT Principles could have sufficed. In this case, this was of
little importance: the Principles used to resolve the dispute were
almost identical in the two collections (UNIDROIT and PECL). What
would happen if they were different? A conflict of principles would
have arisen and therefore rules on conflict of principles might be a
good solution to avoid such an impasse. A rule like specialia
generalibus derogant would suffice to resolve these new forms of
conflict of rules and should be considered implicit in the UNIDROIT
Principles.
Hence, are we facing a new form of renvoi? Two European
contractors decide to choose as the applicable law the UNIDROIT
Principles; since the PECL's sphere of application would match with
the case, should the arbitrator apply the PECL because of the
unwritten lex specialis rule? Are we saying that there is a renvoi
among anational rules? So far, no conclusive answer seems to be
available. At the same time, there is a risk that such multiplication
may undermine the UNIDROIT Principles and complicate choice-oflaw problems in international arbitration.

APPLICATIONS OF THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES:
INTERPRETATION OF THE NATIONAL LEX CONTRACTUS

IV. UNFORESEEN

Beyond constituting a novum genus of applicable law to
substance, lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT Principles are ever
more frequently being employed in the context of the application of a
domestic law. Here, as the experience of state contracts has shown,
arbitrators may combine national law and general principles of law in
order to reach a legal conclusion consistent with needs of
predictability and capable of enjoying international consensus.

64.

The aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation for harm sustained
as a result of the non-performance. Such harm includes both any loss
which it suffered and any gain of which it was deprived, taking into
account any gain to the aggrieved party resulting from its avoidance of
cost or harm; Such harm may be non-pecuniary and includes, for
instance, physical suffering or emotional distress.
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Another species inside this taxonomy of cases can be found
whenever international arbitrators interpret the applicable national
law and, in particular, the so-called "general clauses16 5 (notions et
contenu variable; Generalklauseln) throughout transnational rules

including the UNIDROIT Principles.
Peculiarly, the Preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles and their
Commentary do not foresee such a use but arbitral practice has shown
a clear trend in the opposite sense-rejoining mixed arbitration case
law. The Preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles provides only for using
the Principles as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise applicable
in situations where it is extremely difficult or impossible to determine
the relevant rule of the lex contractus.6 6 No reference is made to other
situations, i.e. if and when the relevant domestic law may be applied
taking into account transnational rules. The Commentary states:
The Principles may however become relevant even where the contract
is governed by a particular domestic law. This is the case whenever it
proves extremely difficult if not impossible to establish the relevant
rule of that particular domestic law with respect to a specific issue and
a solution can be found in the Principles. The reasons for such a
difficulty generally lie in the special character of the legal sources
and/or the cost of access to them.
Recourse to the Principles as a substitute for the domestic law
otherwise applicable is of course to be seen as a last resort; on the other
hand, it may be justified not only in the event of the absolute
impossibility of establishing the relevant rule of the applicable law, but
also whenever the research involved would entail disproportionate
efforts and/or costs. The current practice of courts in such situations is
that of applying the lex fori. Recourse to the Principles would have the
advantage of avoiding the application of a law which will in most cases
67
be more familiar to one of the parties.

The analysis of arbitral practice shows that these planned for
situations appear, to the international arbitrator, as somewhat
marginal if not insignificant. Instead, the UNIDROIT Principles have
been applied under the perspective of interpreting and integrating a
domestic lex contractus in 18 out of 38 cases that is, about 48 percent
68
of ICC cases.
In this category of applications, arbitrators have applied the
proper domestic law analyzing it through the conceptual matrix
offered by the Principles. In this way, domestic law has been applied
in a sort of de-localized fashion. After giving an example of this line of

65.
The common lawyer will greatly benefit from reading the following, though
mainly conceived under an Anglo-German perspective: B.S. MARKESINIS ET AL., THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RESTITUTION: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 21-23 (1997).
66.
UNIDROIT Principles, supranote 2, pmbl.
67.
Id. cmt.
68.
See ICC Awards Nos. 5835, 8223, 8240, 8264, 8486, 8540, 8908, 9117, 9333,
9593 and their excerpts, discussed in Marrella & G61inas, supra note 2.
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cases, we will point out to what we have called the risk of the lex
cognita approach.
A. A New Instrument for InternationalArbitrators:the TNT Test
Transnational rules, be they from the lex mercatoria or the
UNIDROIT Principles, may sometimes be found by selecting those
domestic rules that converge with the UNIDROIT Principles. Hence,
it becomes clear that another way to avoid local solutions is simply to
highlight rules of a specific domestic law enjoying wide international
consensus. In other words, UNIDROIT Principles may be used by
arbitrators to give a transnational status to (national) applicable law.
From this perspective, the UNIDROIT Principles may be used by
arbitrators to carry out what I wish to label as the transnationaltest
(or the T-test, or even the TNT test) of legal solutions found in the
applicable domestic law. If what we have observed holds true, it
follows that we may face a turning point in the evolution of conflictof-law methods in arbitration.
Classical criticism, according to which the conflict-of-law method
is not adapted to the discipline of transnational economic relations,
may be partially overturned. The criticism that the conflict-of-law
method-especially under the savignian approach-gives a parochial
solution of domestic law to transnational economic transactions may
be bypassed through the transnational test carried out ex post by
arbitrators. Once the proper domestic law has been determined,
arbitrators will dispose of an objective instrument to verify if those
specific rules drawn from the domestic legal system are in tune with
those elementary and universal principles of international contract
law contained in the UNIDROIT Principles. Summing up, the method
of transnational rules may well represent, in the context of classical
private international law,6 9 a new method in matters of adaptation of
foreign law.
B. A First Example: ICC Award Number 8264
Again, the best explanation of this approach may be found in an
actual case: ICC Award Number 8264 rendered in 1997. A U.S. civil
engineering equipment manufacturer signed an agreement with an
Algerian state-owned industrial development corporation relating to
the design, production, start-up and initial management of industrial
facilities. Annexed to the agreement was a contract between the same
parties providing for the transfer of industrial property rights and
know-how useful to the activities covered in the main contract. The

69.

ed., 1993).

See, e.g., DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (Lawrence Collins
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Algerian party agreed to pay a fixed sum and a proportional fee for
each machine manufactured.
After some time, the U.S. manufacturer accused the other party
of stopping payment of the proportional fees without justification, of
furnishing incomplete dispatch reports, and subsequently of sending
no reports at all. The Algerian corporation considered itself justified
in stopping payment of the fees, due to the claimant's failure to
provide improvements likely to be relevant to production.
Accordingly, it sought compensation for damages. In the contract, the
arbitration clause was formulated as follows: "All differences arising
out from this agreement will be resolved definitively according to the
Regulations of conciliation and arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, by one or more arbitrators named in
70°
accordance with this regulation.
Arbitrators established the seat in Paris and, noting an absence
of choice of the applicable law, decided as follows: "[t]he arbitral
tribunal will take into account: applicable laws in Algeria which
govern this agreement, as well as performance of consequent
agreements, of the reasonable forecasts of the parts in the light of the
objectives, the reasons and the goals of convention, and the general
principles of law and international trade usages."'71 Making reference
to general principles in order to determine if incomplete performance
depended on any causes of nullity of the contract as pleaded during
proceedings, the arbitral tribunal decided that, according to general
principles of law, nonperformance (from both sides) of the contract did
not mean at all its cancellation or its nullity. Instead, it evidenced the
common will of the parties of producing legal effects. That solution
was adopted by Article 106 of the Algerian Civil Code, which stated
that "the contract makes the laws of the parties. It cannot be revoked
nor modified without mutual assent or for the causes envisaged by
'72
the law.

70.

ICC Award No. 8264 (author's translation). The original text states:

Tous differends d6coulant de la pr6sente convention seront tranch~s
d~finitivement suivent le Rglement de conciliation et d'arbitrage de la
Chambre de Commerce Internationale de Paris, par un ou plusieurs arbitres
nomm~s conform~ment Ace R~glement.
71.

Id. (author's translation). The original text states:

Le tribunal arbitral tiendra compte: des lois applicables en Alg6rie qui
r~gissent cette convention, ainsi que l'ex~cution des accords qui en sont la suite
ou la consequence, des pr6visions raisonnables des parties A la lumi~re des
objectifs, des motifs et des buts de la convention, et des principes g6n6raux du
droit et des usages du commerce international.
72.

Id. (author's translation). The original text states:

Au regard des principes g~n6raux du droit des contrats, son inex6cution (qui est
d'ailleurs le fait des deux parties) ne saurait entrainer ni son annulation, ni,
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Hence, the arbitral tribunal considered the respondent to have
fulfilled its duty to forward the dispatch reports and to provide
information on the changes made to the licensed products. It then
determined that payment of the proportional fees was still
outstanding. Additionally, since the U.S. claimant's duty was limited
to improvements to the products and equipment covered by the
contract, the claimant did not provide necessary information leading
to a loss of opportunity for the respondent, thus breaching the rule
contained in Article 7.4.3(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles. 73 The
tribunal also estimated the harm caused at one-tenth of the sum
claimed and ordered this to be offset against the fees due by the
respondent to the claimant. It decided not to order payment of
interest on overdue amounts, as the claimant's omissions were largely
to account for the lack of payment. In conclusion, this example
illustrates-though in the context of an arbitration clause
particularly "open" to application of principles-the possible interplay
between a domestic law (i.e. Algerian law) and transnational rules
codified in the UNIDROIT Principles.
C. A New Risk for the Development of InternationalArbitration:The
Lex Cognita Approach
Ubi commoda et ibi incommoda, we have to acknowledge that
finding the convergence between transnational rules and domestic
law may sometimes be an illusion. The potential problem, using the
UNIDROIT Principles in such a context, is that they may also be
used as a good justification for a lack of reasoning in the choice of the
applicable rules of law. Arbitrators may face the temptation to use
74
more or less openly what has been called a lex cognita approach.
This situation may occur whenever arbitrators apply only the rules of
their national law, motivating that the solution would have been the
same had the UNIDROIT Principles been applied. The risk is that,
instead of representing a step forward in the evolution of

comme les pr6tend [la demanderesse, n.d.r.] sa caducit6. I1reste l'expression de
la volont6 commune des parties et conserve sa force obligatoire tant qu'il n'a
pas t r6solu. C'est 6galement la r6gle du Code Civil Alg~rien, dont larticle
106 dispose que "le contrat fait la lois des parties. I1 ne peut 6tre r6voqu6 ni
modifi6 que de leur consentement mutuel ou pour les causes pr6vues par la loi.
73.

Id. (author's translation). The original text states:

En droit du commerce international, 'la perte d'une chance peut 6tre r~par~e
dans la mesure de la probabilit6 de sa realization.' Ainsi s'expriment les
Principes d'UNIDROIT relatifs aux commerce international (article 7.4.3, a.
1.2), qui consacrent, comme on le sait des r~gles tr~s largement admises A
travers le monde dans le syst~mes juridiques et la pratique des contrats
internationaux.
74.

See generally Marrella & G6linas, supra note 2.
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international business law, the UNIDROIT Principles might be used
to mask what is in fact a poorly reasoned selection and a strict
application of domestic law (the national law of the arbitrator) to an
international transaction.
Motivation in arbitration awards becomes a means of control for
the parties over the reasons arbitrators have found to choose any set
of rules, be they national or anational. Top arbitrators have always
shown a real punctilio on choice-of-law issues and the same precision
should serve to distinguish good from bad awards. It is now
interesting to look at cases in which arbitrators have applied the
UNIDROIT Principles as a means to interpret international
conventions.
D. TransnationalRules and InternationalUniform Law Conventions
Another category of arbitral applications of the UNIDROIT
Principles consists of using them in order to resolve matters of
interpretation or, eventually, to fill gaps in international conventions
such as CISG. 75 Without entering into the continuing debate over
national
versus
autonomous
means
of interpreting
and
supplementing international uniform law conventions, 76 we here
simply focus on the position of the arbitrator. From this standpoint,
transnational rules may become applicable at least through the
renvoi contained in the convention towards general principles. The
theorem is simple in its basic assumption: if and only if the
convention is applicable, it follows, coeteris paribus, that
transnational rules may be applied on the ground of a specific rule
contained in the particular convention at issue.
Then again, in case of doubts on the precise meaning of rules of
an international uniform law convention, the solution may be found
in transnational rules, such as the lex mercatoriaor the UNIDROIT
Principles. After considering the state of the art of ICC arbitral
practice on this specific point, including a practical example, I shall
illustrate further applications of the interpretation and gap filling
method.
1. Arbitral Practice
In ICC arbitral practice, UNIDROIT Principles have been used
as a means of interpretation and supplementation of international
conventions in at least five cases which, in perspective, allow us to

75.

UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 7.

76.

See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE

INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2d. ed. 1998); M.
Gebauer, Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation,5 UNIFORM
L. REV. 683, 683-705 (2000).
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estimate this group at approximately 13 percent of all UNIDROIT
awards.7 7 In this line of arbitral jurisprudence, arbitrators have
employed the Principles mainly in the context of interpreting the
1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).
The nexus between the CISG and the Principles may be found in
Article 7 of the Vienna Convention where it is stated that:
(1)
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.
(2)
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with
the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules
78
of private international law.

Therefore, the need of "international interpretation" of the CISG is
satisfied by UNIDROIT Principles as it will be seen in the following
example.
2. One Practical Example: ICC Award Number 8769
A practical example of this line of cases may be found in ICC
Award Number 8769. 79 The parties entered into a manufacturing
contract, plus a tooling agreement related to it. The claimant alleged
a breach of contract by the respondent, referring to misleading
conduct in negotiations, failure to meet technical specifications,
misuse of tooling, and non-registration of patent. The respondent
objected and filed a counterclaim to cover balance of tooling costs,
unused packaging and materials, warehouse costs, settlement
payment for termination of licensing agreement, additional
machinery costs, outstanding invoices, and lost profits. The sole
arbitrator applied French law and the 1980 Vienna Convention on
contracts for the international sale of goods (CISG), in accordance
with the agreement reached by the parties in the arbitration clause.
He rejected the claimant's demands and granted the respondent's
counterclaims. In awarding interests, he referred to Article 7.4.9(2)
of the UNIDROIT Principles relating to the rate of interest.
Thus, Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles has been allowed
to fill gaps in Article 78 of the CISG by determining the legal
autonomy of the right to interests for failure to pay money whether or

77.
note 2.
78.
79.

See Award Nos. 8128, 8769, 8817, discussed in Marrella & G6linas, supra
Vienna Sales Convention, supra note 29, art. 7.
Id. at 75.
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not the non-payment is excused.80 The same approach has also been

used when arbitrators have been confronted with the problem of

80.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, at art. 7.4.9 (interest for failure to pay
money states):
(1) If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the aggrieved party
is entitled to interest upon that sum from the time when payment is due to the
time of payment whether or not the non-payment is excused; (2) The rate of
interest shall be the average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers
prevailing for the currency of payment at the place for payment, or where no
such rate exists at that place, then the same rate in the State of the currency of
payment. In the absence of such a rate at either place the rate of interest shall
be the appropriate rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency of payment;
(3) The aggrieved party is entitled to additional damages if the non-payment
caused it a greater harm.
The UNIDROIT commentary to Article 7.4.9 states:
1. Lump sum compensation for failure to pay a sum of money.
This article reaffirms the widely accepted rule according to which the harm
resulting from delay in the payment of a sum of money is subject to a special
regime and is calculated by a lump sum corresponding to the interest accruing
between the time when payment of the money was due and the time of actual
payment.
Interest is payable whenever the delay in payment is attributable to the nonperforming party, and this as from the time when payment was due, without
any need for the aggrieved party to give notice of the default. If the delay is the
consequence of force majeure (e.g. the non-performing party is prevented from
obtaining the sum due by reason of the introduction of new exchange control
regulations), interest will still be due not as damages but as compensation for
the enrichment of the debtor as a result of the non-payment as the debtor
continues to receive interest on the sum which it is prevented from paying.
The harm is calculated as a lump sum. In other words, subject to para. (3) of
this article, the aggrieved party may not prove that it could have invested the
sum due at a higher rate of interest or the non-performing party that the
aggrieved party would have obtained interest at a rate lower than the average
lending rate referred to in para. (2).The parties may of course agree in advance
on a different rate of interest (which would in effect subject it to Art. 7.4.13).
2. Rate of interest
Paragraph two of this article fixes in the first instance as the rate of interest
the average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers. This solution
seems to be that best suited to the needs of international trade and most
appropriate to ensure an adequate compensation of the harm sustained. The
rate in question is the rate at which the aggrieved party will normally borrow
the money which it has not received from the non-performing party. That
normal rate is the average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers
prevailing at the place for payment for the currency of payment.
No such rate may however exist for the currency of payment at the place for
payment. In such cases, reference is made in the first instance to the average
prime rate in the State of the currency of payment. For instance, if a loan is
made in pounds sterling payable at Tunis and there is no rate for loans in
pounds on the Tunis financial market, reference will be made to the rate in the
United Kingdom.
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determining the interest rate to use as a base for determining the
total amount of the sum due for the lacking payment.
3. Future Applications
Future applications in this category of cases may concern other
international uniform law conventions containing rules of
interpretation referring to needs of uniformity in the application of
the convention or even a reference to concepts of "good faith in
international trade." Actually, these formulas seem recurrent in a
certain number of conventions regulating international business law.
We may thus refer to the UNIDROIT Convention on
International Factoring of May 28, 1988, where Article 4 states:
1. - In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade.
2. - Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules
81
of private international law.

Again, in Article 14 of the 1991 U.N. Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade, it is stated
that: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to

In the absence of such a rate at either place, the rate of interest will be the
"appropriate" rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency of payment. In
most cases this will be the legal rate of interest and, as there may be more than
one, that most appropriate for international transaction. If there is no legal
rate of interest, the rate will be the most appropriate bank rate.
3. Additional damages recoverable
Interest is intended to compensate the harm normally sustained as a
consequence of delay in payment of a sum of money. Such delay may however
cause additional harm to the aggrieved party for which it may recover
damages, always provided that it can prove the existence of such harm and
that it meets the requirements of certainty and foreseeability (para. (3)).
81.
The same approach may be found in Article 6 of the UNIDROIT Convention
on International Financial Leasing, May 20, 1988, availableat http://www.unidroit.org/
englishlconventions/c-leas.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003):
1.
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its object
and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its international character and to
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith in international trade.
2.
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law."

1176

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:1137

its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
'8 2
its application.
Finally, another example may be found at Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 30 March
1978 (The Hamburg Rules) where, it is expressly stated that: "In the
interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention
regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity." Moreover, the Hamburg Rules are inspired on
the base of the favor arbitri as it is revealed at Article 22 of such
83

rules.

In conclusion, as long as international uniform law conventions
provide for such rules of interpretation referring to general principles
and the need for a uniform application, it seems that transnational
rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles and the lex mercatoria may

82.
U.N. Convention on the Liberty of Operators of Transport Terminals in
International Trade, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 152/13 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1503
(1991).
83.
U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, art. 22, Mar. 30, 1978.
Article 22- Arbitration
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, parties may provide by
agreement evidenced in writing that any dispute that may arise relating to
carriage of goods under this Convention shall be referred to arbitration.
2. Where a charter-party contains a provision that disputes arising
thereunder shall be referred to arbitration and a bill of lading issued pursuant
to the charterparty does not contain a special annotation providing that such
provision shall be binding upon the holder of the bill of lading, the carrier may
not invoke such provision as against a holder having acquired the bill of lading
in good faith.
3. The arbitration proceedings shall, at the option of the Claimant, be
instituted at one of the following places:
(a)

A place in a State within whose territory is situated:
(i) The principal place of business of the Defendant or, in the
absence thereof, the habitual residence of the Defendant; or
(ii) The place where the contract was made, provided that the
Defendant has there a place of business, branch or agency through
which the contract was made; or

(iii) The port of loading or the port of discharge; or
(b) Any place designated for that purpose in the arbitration clause or
agreement.
4. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply the rules of this
Convention.
5. The provisions of paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article are deemed to be part
of every arbitration clause or agreement, and any term of such clause or
agreement which is inconsistent therewith is null and void.
6. Nothing in this Article affects the validity of an agreement relating to
arbitration made by the parties after the claim under the contract of carriage
by sea has arisen.
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supply the necessary rules to fill gaps and avoid ambiguities. 8 4
Arbitrators are specialists in international trade and business law
and they will select with care those transnational rules which are
useful to resolve the dispute. In the right hands, the method of
transnational rules is a plus and never a minus for international
arbitrators.
E. Excluding the UNIDROIT Principles
For a complete analysis of the role of the UNIDROIT Principles
and their relationship with lex mercatoria, great attention must be
paid to awards in which the application of the UNIDROIT Principles
has been excluded. 85 These cases have shown that an arbitration
clause pointing to a given domestic law with the express exclusion of
every other legal system has the result of excluding the application
both of the lex mercatoria and of the UNIDROIT Principles.
Furthermore, another award has shown that the UNIDROIT
Principles do not constitute per se a codification of international trade
usages. On the contrary, the characterization of a specific UNIDROIT
principle within the category of international trade usages needs
demonstration.
International commercial law of the third millennium thus
seems to be heading towards a progressive differentiation between
principles of contract law including the UNIDROIT Principles and
international trade usages.8 6 This process will have a profound
impact on the application of the ubiquitous formula common in
arbitration regulations, national statutes, and international
conventions, according to which the arbitrator shall take account of
relevant trade usages. Between 1994 and the end of 2000, three cases
(8 percent of the total) mentioned the UNIDROIT Principles in order
to exclude their application.8 7 In ICC Award Number 9419, the
arbitrator simply declared not to adhere to doctrines of either lex
mercatoria or the UNIDROIT Principles. Therefore he opted for a

84.
In the matters of international bills of exchange, a domain which has
represented a sort of laboratory of uniform law, the recent UNCITRAL Convention on
International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 1988, provides in
Article 4, that: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international transaction."
85.
This important category of cases has been analyzed by the author in
Marrella & G6linas, supra note 2.
86.
See Roy Goode, Usage and Its Reception in TransnationalCommercial Law,
46 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 1 (1997); Emmanuel Gaillard, La distinction des principesgdndraux
du droit et des usages du commerce international,in ETUDES BELLET 203.
87.
See ICC Awards Nos. 8873, 9029 and 9419, discussed in Marrella &
G6linas, supranote 2, at 78-81, 88-96, 104-06.
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traditional application of conflict of laws rules in order to localize the
contract in a domestic legal system.
ICC Award Number 9029 is far more interesting. In that case,
arbitrators faced a choice-of-law clause in favor of Italian law as the
applicable law. One of the parties asked for the UNIDROIT Principles
or lex mercatoriato be applied, inter alia, on the basis of Italian rules
concerning international commercial arbitration and namely Article
834 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure in which reference is made
to trade usages. The arbitral tribunal rejected such an interpretation
in favor of a strict application of the applicable domestic law.
Nonetheless, arbitrators went on to show that, had they applied
UNIDROIT Principles or lex mercatoria,the result would have been
the same had Italian law been applied.
The most striking example of this line of cases is, however, ICC
Award Number 8873. In connection with the construction of a road in
Algeria, the claimant, a French company, entered into a contract with
Respondent 1, a Spanish company, whose rights were assigned to
Respondent 2, another Spanish Company. As the claimant fell behind
schedule in performing the work, Respondent 2 asked it to increase
its resources so as to make up the lost time. The claimant's
justification for the delay was deterioration in political conditions in
Algeria, which, it alleged, prevented it from mobilizing the necessary
personnel and extra-work requested by Respondent 2. It suggested
that the terms of their collaboration should be renegotiated, filing a
claim to cease the work on grounds of force majeure.
An amendment was subsequently drawn up and various changes
were made to the initial contract. The work continued but fell behind
schedule again. Respondent 2, therefore, claimed penalty payments
for late performance and made the payment of invoices subject to the
claimant's issuing a credit note covering the amount of the penalties.
A deadlock ensued, with the claimant refusing to sign the credit notes
and asking for sums invoiced to be paid and Respondent 2 refusing to
pay the invoices until it had received the credit notes. In the face of
this situation, the claimant introduced its request for arbitration
referring to hardship and force majeure to account for the delay in the
performance of the work. Its claims concerned outstanding invoices
due for payment by Respondent 2 and various additional costs that it
had been caused to incur. Respondent 2 made a counterclaim in order
to obtain payment of the penalties for late performance and to be
covered for certain additional costs it had been caused to incur.
The arbitration clause was read:
Arbitration and choice of law. This contract shall be entirely
governed by Spanish Law, excluding any other legal system. Any
dispute arising in connection with the interpretation, validity or any
effect of the contract, shall be settled by arbitration which shall take
place in Madrid (Spain) under the Rule of conciliation and arbitration
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of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrors
appointed in accordance with said rules. 8 8

The arbitral tribunal, sitting in Madrid, determined the
applicable law to the merits as being Spanish Law. However,
according to the claimant, the dispute was not to be decided only on
the basis of Spanish law, but taking into proper account international
trade usages. This reasoning would lead to apply general principles of
law and, in particular, usages in the field of public procurements
(usages existants dans les contrats internationationaux de g~nie
civil). 89
The defendant pleaded against this approach showing that,
under Spanish law, the contrato de obras is disciplined by the civil
code. Therefore, usages and customs would have been effective
secundum legem, that is, within the limits set forth by Spanish civil
law rules, regardless of all other commercial considerations. In order
to resolve this issue, arbitrators recalled Article 13 of the ICC
Regulations and Article VII of the 1961 Geneva Convention,
observing that they were not bound to follow strictly any national law
when determining the effects of trade usages for the transaction. 90
They added that, when there is a question of determining the role of
trade usages, the Geneva Convention, via the rules of its Article VII,
allows the arbitrators a very broad discretionary margin. This
discretionary power results in attributing international trade usages
a legal force which can be limited only in the presence of mandatory
rules of the lex contractus. From this perspective, a rule can be
ascribed to trade usages only if it is widely known and regularly
observed in a given trade. 91
According to the claimant, hardship rules may be found in the
UNIDROIT Principles 92 and constitute a common clause in
international standard contracts. In particular, hardship clauses are

88.
ICC Award No. 8873, discussed in Marrella & G6linas, supra note 2.
89.
Id.
90.
See ICC Award No. 8873 (author's translation). The original text of the
award states, "[Les arbitres] ne sont pas lis aux r~gles strictes d'un droit national
lorsqu'il s'agit de dterminer si, et dans quelle mesure, les usages du commerce
peuvent s'appliquer, 6ventuellement en substitution de normes dispositives de la loi
applicable."
91.
Therefore, according to arbitrators:
il faut par consequent 6tablir qu'il s'agit de r~gles que les personnes engag6es
dans le commerce international (et en particulier dans la branche en question)
consid~rent applicables sans aucun besoin d'une r~frence expresse, parce
qu'elles sont devenues obligatoires comme consequence d'un usage r~pandu et
continu. II est 6vident que cette apprdciation doit 6tre faite avec prudence, afin
d'Aviter que les parties se trouvent soumises A des r6gles dont elles ne
pouvaient pas attendre raisonnablement qu'elles soient applicable.
ICC Award No. 8873.
92.
See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, arts. 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3.
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contained both in FIDIC (edition V) and in ENAA conditions (ENAA
Model form International Contract for Process Plant Construction).
With regard to the legal nature of the UNIDROIT Principles, the
arbitral tribunal noted that those Principles could find an application
when the parties have agreed that their contract should be governed
by them. In the specific case at issue, parties had not made any
reference to the Principles. Therefore, it followed that the UNIDROIT
Principles were not applicable. Moreover, arbitrators added that:
The only means to justify their application would be of saying that they
[the UNIDROIT Principles] are a codification of existing usages. In
order to reach this conclusion it would be necessary to prove that the
rules called upon by Claimant (and in particular those on Hardship,
contained in articles 6.2.1 and following) correspond to a generally
established
international
practice, which people engaged
in
international trade consider as binding regardless its written
stipulation.

93

However, the arbitral tribunal considered that although there is
a tendency to stipulate hardship clauses in certain sectors of
international trade in a repetitive way, in business practice an
obligation of renegotiation of the contract constitutes a principle of
exceptional matters notwithstanding rules of the UNIDROIT
Principles. Furthermore, one has to consider the degree of detail with
which the hardship clauses are stipulated. If hardship clauses must
be stipulated in the contract and detailed, it follows that they cannot
be considered trade usages since their content varies from time to
time.
The conclusion of the tribunal was the following:
It is thus excluded that provisions on Hardship contained in the
UNIDROIT Principles are trade usages. On the contrary, they do not
correspond, at least at present times, to current practice of business in
international trade and therefore their applicability depends on an
express contractual reference from the parties, which is not the case at
94
issue.

93.

ICC Award No. 8873 (author's translation). The original text is as follows:

Le seul moyen pour justifier leur application serait de dire qu'il s'agit d'une
"codification" des usages existants et que le Principes d'UNIDROIT devraient
6tre appliquds dans cette qualit6 d'usages codifies par l'UNIDROIT. Pour
arriver i cette conclusion il faudrait prouver que les r~gles invoqu~es par la
demanderesse (et en particulier celles sur la Hardship, contenus dans les
articles 6.2.1 et suivants) correspondent A un usage international g~nralement
6tabli, auquel les personnes engag~es dans le commerce international se
consid~rent li~es sans besoin d'une stipulation expresse dans ce sen.
94.

ICC Award No. 8873 (author's translation). The original text is as follows:

Il est donc exclu que l'on puisse consid~rer les dispositions en mati~re de
Hardship contenues dans les Principes d'UNIDROIT comme des usages du
commerce. I1 s'agit, au contraire, de r~gles qui ne correspondent pas, au moins
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Once decided against the application of the UNIDROIT Principles to
the case at stake, arbitrators considered the issue of applicability of
FIDIC and ENAA Conditions.
FIDIC and ENAA general conditions of contract were
characterized as standard contracts. In such a situation, these rules
would have been applicable only if the parties had expressly or
implicitly made reference to them. Nonetheless, arbitrators observed
that principles contained in standard contracts, typical of certain
economic sectors of trade, can become usages. Therefore, standard
contracts may become trade usages whenever it is proven that they
are applied, without need of agreement, in transactions among
companies of a given economic sector.
In other words, according to the arbitral tribunal, two conditions
must be matched:
Rules must be established in practice of business with a sufficient
degree of uniformity in order to be applied directly (like standard
formulas) without need to negotiate further elements . .. [and secondly]
that the same rules or principles are applied by economic operators of
the branch in question even in absence of an express clause in the
95
contract.

As the claimant's invoked hardship and force majeure principles were
based on FIDIC and ENAA clauses, it followed, once again, that
arbitrators faced rules of an exceptional nature which, in their
opinion, did not seem yet sufficiently "ripe" to be transformed into
uniform and autonomous rules on that specific issue. From this
perspective, arbitrators finally concluded that those principles
represented mere "contractual formulas." As such, those rules had no
legal value beyond the context of the standard contract containing
them. As the tribunal correctly noted, the claimant had not shown
that both the UNIDROIT Principles and the FIDIC or ENAA
conditions formed a usage that parties knew or ought to have known,
and which in international trade is widely known by parties to
contracts of the particular trade concerned. For all these reasons, the
application of hardship rules contained in UNIDROIT principles as
well as in FIDIC and ENAA conditions were rejected.

A ltat
actuel, A la pratique courante des affaires dans le commerce
international et qui ne seront par consequent applicables que lorsque les
parties y ont fait une r~frence expresse, ce qui n'est pas le cas ici.
95.

ICC Award No. 8873 (author's translation). The original text is as follows

[Q]u'il s'agisse de solutions 6tablies dans la pratique des affaires avec un degr6
suffisant d'uniformit6 pour pouvoir 6tre appliqu~es directement (comme
formule standard) sans besoin de n~gocier des 6lments ulterieurs; qu'il soit
prouv6 que les principes que l'on veut consid~rer comme des usages sont
appliques par les entreprises de la branche en question m~me dans l'absence
d'une pr~vision expresse dans le contrat.
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WITH STATE CONTROL

MECHANISMS

The last (but not at all the least) question raised by
transnational rules like the UNIDROIT Principles and lex mercatoria
are their possible interaction or conflict with control mechanisms. On
this issue there are many important scholarly writings on lex
mercatoriawhich may be recalled, and may it suffice to present only a
96
few remarks concerning mandatory rules and public policy.
First of all, the UNIDROIT Principles are not intended to be
applied against mandatory rules. Article 1.4 of the UNIDROIT
Principles states that: "[n]othing in these Principles shall restrict the
application of mandatory rules, whether of national, international, or
supranational origin, which are applicable in accordance with the
''97
relevant rules of private international law.

96.
See generally Norbert Horn, Codes of Conduct for MNEs and Transnational
Lex Mercatoria:An International Process of Learning and Law Making, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 45-81 (1980);
Hubert Moitry, Arbitrage internationalet droit de la concurrence: vers un ordre public
de la lex mercatoria?, 1989 REV. ARB. 3 (1989); FILALI OSMAN, LES PRINCIPES
GENERAUX DE LA LEX MERCATORIA 381 (1992); William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in
the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION
109 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 2d ed. 1998) (observing that "[tihe healthy elaboration
of transnational economic norms requires judicial control mechanisms to insure that
arbitral awards purporting to be based on lex mercatoria represent more than the
arbitrator's personal notions of justice"); Fabrizio Marrella, Arbitrato e strumenti di
lotta alla criminalit& transnazionale riconducibili all'autonormazione ed alla lex
mercatoria,in LA SFIDA ALL'ECONOMIA CRIMINALE NELL'ESPERIENZA GIURIDICA ITALIANA
41-100 (2002) (discussing forms of limitation of party autonomy coming from self
limitation of the international business community).
97.

UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 1.4:

1. Mandatory rules prevail. Given the particular nature of the Principles,
they cannot be expected to prevail over applicable mandatory rules, whether of
national, international or supranational origin. In other words, mandatory
provisions, whether enacted by States autonomously or to implement
international conventions, or adopted by supranational organisations, cannot
be overruled by the Principle.
2. Mandatory rules applicable in the event of mere incorporation of the
Principles in the contract. In cases where the parties' reference to the
Principles is considered to be only an agreement to incorporate them in the
contract, the Principles will first of all encounter the limit of the mandatory
rules of the law governing the contract, i.e. they will bind the parties only to the
extent that they do not affect the rules of the applicable law from which parties
may not contractually derogate. In addition, the mandatory rules of the forum,
and possibly also those of third States, will likewise prevail, provided that they
claim application whatever the law governing the contract and, in the case of
the rules of third States, there is a close connection between those States and
the contract in question.
3. Mandatory rules applicable if the Principles are the law governing the
contract. Yet, even where, as may be the case if the dispute is brought before an
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Second, there is a certain uniformity of views (at least in
continental Europe) that mandatory rules (lois de police in French
literature, norme di applicazione necessaria in Italian writings;
international zwingende Rechtssdtze or Zweckgesetze in German
works) are intended to protect essential interests touching the
political, economic, and social organization of the forum law. 98 Thus,

arbitral tribunal, the Principles are applied as the law governing the contract,
they cannot prejudice the application of those mandatory rules which claim
application irrespective of which law is applicable to the contract (lois
d'application n~cessaire). Examples of such mandatory rules, the application of
which cannot be excluded simply by choosing another law, are to be found in
the field of foreign exchange regulations (see Articles of the Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, (Bretton Woods Agreement)), import-export
licences (see Articles of these Principles on public permission requirements),
regulations pertaining to restrictive trade practices, etc.
4. Recourse to the rules of private international law relevant in each
individual case. Both courts and arbitral tribunals differ considerably in the
way in which they determine the mandatory rules applicable'to international
commercial contracts. For this reason the present article deliberately refrains
from entering into the merit of the various questions involved, in particular
whether in addition to the mandatory rules of the forum and of the lex
contractus those of third States are also to be taken into account and if so, to
what extent and on the basis of which criteria. These questions are to be settled
in accordance with the rules of private international law which are relevant in
each particular case.
See, e.g., 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art.
7, discussed supra note 38.
98.
Cf. Law 31, art. 17, May 1995, n.218. According to the famous definition
offered by Philippe Francescakis mandatory rules are those "lois dont l'observations est
n6cessaire pour la sauvegarde de l'organisation politique, sociale et 6conomique du
pays." Philippe Francescakis, Quelques prdcisions sur les lois d'application immddiate
et leurs rapport avec les r~gles de conflit des lois, 55 REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L PRIV. 1 (1966);
See generally R. AGO, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 303 (1939); ERNST

RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 558 (1945); Karl H. Neumayer,
Autonomie de la volont4 et dispositions impgratives en droit internationalprivg des
obligations, 46 REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L PRIV. 579 (1957); T. Ballarino, Norme di
applicazione necessaria e forma degli atti, R.D.I.P.P. 707 (1967); DE NOVA, I CONFLITTI
DI LEGGI E LE NORME SOSTANZIALI FUNZIONALMENTE LIMITATE 699 (1967); G. SPERDUTI,
NORME DI APPLICAZIONE NECESSARIA E ORDINE PUBBLICO 473 (1976); P. Mengozzi,

Norme di applicazione necessariae progetto di Convenzione CEE sulla legge applicabile
alle obbligazioni contrattuali (la Conflict of Laws Revolution attraversa l'oceano), in
ARCH. GIUR. SERAFINI 3 (1979); G. Pau, Le norme imperative nella Convenzione CEE
sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali, RIV. DIR. INT. 868 (1982); T.
Treves, Norme imperative e di applicazione necessaria nella convenzione di Roma del
19 giugno 1980, R.D.I.P.P. 25 (1983); P. Mengozzi, La convenzione Cee sulla legge
applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali, il notaio e le norme di applicazione
necessaria,RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV. 165 (1984); G. Cassoni, Spunti in tema di norme
di applicazione necessaria, ARCH. G. 354 (1986); F. Mosconi, Exceptions to the
Operation of Choice of Law Rules, 217 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 9-214 (1989); A. Bucher, L'ordre
public et le but social des lois en droit internationalprivg, R.C.A.D.I. 9, 9-116 (1993); H.
BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, TRAITi DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 425 (1993); A.
Lowenfeld, InternationalLitigation and the Quest for Reasonableness,245 R.C.A.D.I. 9,
9-320 (1994); M. Frigo, La determinazione della legge applicabilein mancanza di scelta
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mandatory rules operate unilaterally imposing substantive rules and
neutralizing the effects of conflict of laws rules. 99
Third, if one tries to find examples of mandatory provisions of
national arbitration law, one will.arrive at different lists according to
the countries examined, since that characterization depends on the
national legislature and the interpretation of national law by the
national courts. One may say generally that certain fundamental
principles of justice and of arbitration procedure appear to be
mandatory in all national laws.
Finally, arbitral case law evidences a growing consideration of
such rules as it is shown, inter alia, in Award Numbers 4237, 5314,

6500, 6320, and 9333.100 In Award Number 4237, deciding a dispute
between

Syrian and Ghanian

parties, the sole arbitrator,

Loek

Malberg, after having excluded application of lex mercatoriain favour
of the application of English Law, pointed out that: " [i]t goes without
saying that the Arbitrator shall have regard to these bases to the
extent that they do not deviate from the mandatory rules of the

dei contraenti e le norme imperative della Convenzione di Roma, in LA CONVENZIONE DI
ROMA SUL DIRITTO APPLICABILE Al CONTRATTI INTERNAZIONALI 21 (2nd ed. 1994); T.

Treves, Art.17 (Norme di applicazione necessaria),R.D.I.P.D. 1 (1995); N. BOSCHIERO,
Art.14-17, in BARIATTI (1995); Legge 31 maggio 1995, N.L.C.C. 1035, 1035 n.218 (1996);

T. Hartley, Mandatory Rules in InternationalContracts: The Common Law Approach,
266 R.C.A.D.I. 337, 337-426 (1997); SERGIO M. CARBONE & R. LUZZATTO, ILCONTRATTO
INTERNAZIONALE 103 (3d ed. 1998); T. Ballarino, Diritto internazionale privato, supra
at 187 (observing that the common feature of these rules is "volere essere applicate
anche quando ilrapporto giuridico sul quale incidono 6 sottoposto ad un ordinamento
straniero, in deroga a quanto previsto dalle norme di conflitto bilaterali"); BERNARD
AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 97 (1997); A. BONOMI, LE NORME IMPERATIVE NEL
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 1 (1998); L. Migliorino, Norme di applicazione
necessariadel foro e convenzioni di diritto internazionaleprivato, in STUDIUM IURIS 109
(1998); Piere Mayer, Lois de police, REP. DR. INT. 3 (1998); YVON LoUSsOUARN & PIERRE
BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 128 (1999); F. TROMBETTA PANIGADI, LE NORME
DI APPLICAZIONE NECESSARIA NEL NUOVO SISTEMA ITALIANO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
PRIVATO 750 (1999); Yvon Loussouarn & Pierre Bourel, Legge regolatricedel contratto e
rilevanza di norme di altri ordinamenti: ordine pubblico e norme di applicazione
necessaria, in IL DIRITTO PRIVATO NELLA GIURISPRUDENZA 240-49 (2000); F. MOSCONI,
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 174, 244 (2d ed. 2001)
99.
"On parle de lois de police pour ddsigner le mcanisme d'applicationd'une
r~gle interne& une situation internationale en fonction de sa volontg d'application et
indipdndamment de sa ddsignation par une rigle de conflit." BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 97 (1997).
100.
See ICC Award No. 8938 (1996):
In virtue of the independent rule of international arbitration law, embodied in
Art. 8(4) of the [ICC, n.d.r.] Rules, the arbitral clause is autonomous and
juridically independent from the main contract in which it is contained either
directly or by reference, and its existence and validity are to be ascertained,
taking into account the mandatory rules of national law and international
public policy, in the light of the common intention of the parties, without
necessarily referring to a state law.
24 Y.B. COM. ARB. 174-81 (1999).
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applicable law." Thus, for Malberg, it is clear that the interference of
mandatory rules is limited to those rules pertaining to the same lex
contractus, avoiding any other consideration on mandatory rules from
the lex situs arbitrior the lex loci executionis.
ICC Award Number 5314, on the other hand, shows that even
though the applicable law to substance of the dispute is the lex
mercatoria (and thus a fortiori, the UNIDROIT Principles) the
interference of mandatory rules remains unchanged. 10 1 A line of cases
which is followed by ICC Award Number 6500 where arbitrators
decide that "even when lex mercatoriais applicable as any proper law
of the contract-the court or the arbitrator-should take into account
mandatory rules and public policy of another legal system if there are
good and just reasons to do so (see Article 7 of the Rome Convention
10 2
on the applicable law to contractual obligations)."'

ICC Award No. 5314, 13 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 35-40 (1988). According to the
101.
arbitrators:
Whereas under Swiss Rules of Conflict, the Tribunal f~dral, although the
question is a controversial one, has applied to a licence Agreement the law of
the domicile of the licensor, as this party is considered to perform the
characteristic obligation (ATF 101 II 293). Whereas this solution has also been
adopted by the new Federal law on private international law (Art. 122(1)) ...
Whereas however, such solution has been criticized, in particular on the basis
that the law of the domicile of the licensee may contain mandatory rules which
in any case, have to be observed.
102.
See excerpts in 119 J. DU DROIT INT'L (1992) (citing Arnaldez, Recueil, III
CCI), at 452-54.
[L]orsque la est applicable comme toute autre "proper law" du contrat-le juge
ou l'arbitre-devrait tenir compte d'une norme d'application immbdiate o11
d'ordre public appartenant A un autre syst6me loefrsqu'il y a de bonnes et
justes raisons de le faire (V.art. 7 de la Convention de Rome entre les Etats
membres de la CEE sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles). C'est
pr~cis~ment le cas dans ce litige. Dans la mesure oAt la loi libanaise est
imperative et a pour but de prot6ger le reprsentant, cette loi est d'ordre public.
De ce fait, m~me si le tribunal dcidait d'appliquer la lex mercatoria, il ne
devrait pas ignorer de telles dispositions. Enfin, mime si la loi libhnaise est

applicable, la lex mercatoriapeut encore 6tre utilisge dans l'applicationde la loi
libanaise,ou dans la mesure oA la loi libanaise est silencieuse.
For a decision in which RICO was considered mandatory law excluding sanctions of
treble damages, see ICC Award No. 6320 (1992), 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 62-109 (1995).
Arbitrators have observed:
While the United States is certainly free to mandate application of its law to
its nationals and to others within its jurisdiction, the Tribunal cannot find that
such a mandatory application is in this Case warranted with regard to a
foreign national outside the United States' jurisdiction. The fact that the
foreign national itself 'seeks' the protection of RICO cannot affect the above
finding, since it seeks a 'mandatory' protection that would be contrary to the
choice of law it agreed to with the other party.
The conclusion might be different if the national mandatory law would have
to be considered as reflecting a principle of international public policy.
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Finally, ICC Award Number 9333 confirms further that the
question of applicability of mandatory rules to international
arbitration does not really change according to the national or
anational nature of the applicable law. On the public policy exception
as a form of control device the same conclusions apply. Respect of
public policy of the lex situs arbitri and/or (after Hilmarton and
Chromalloy cases) of the lex loci executionis is imposed by domestic
courts regardless of the specific national or anational origin of the
rules applied by arbitrators. What counts at exequatur stage is only
the legal result of the arbitral decision and not the rules of law
employed to reach it.
This insight finds confirmation in Ministry of Defense and
Support for the Armed Forces of The Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Defense Systems, Inc.:
Cubic also disputes the Tribunal's reference to the Principles of
International Commercial Contracts published in 1994 by the
UNIDROIT Institute (UNIDROIT Principles) and the Tribunal's
references to principles of fairness such as good faith and fair dealing.
Cubic claims that references to such international and equitable
principles also violates Art. V(1)(c) because this law exceeds the scope of
the Terms of Reference. The reference to the UNIDROIT Principles
does not exceed the scope of the Terms of Reference. One of the issues
presented to the Tribunal was whether general principles of
international law apply to this dispute. That Cubic disagrees with the
Tribunal's response to the question posed by the parties is not a reason
to find that the Tribunal addressed issues beyond the scope of the
Terms of Reference. The same is true for Cubic's assertions with regard
to the Tribunal's references to equitable principles of contract law. 103

However, such a qualification cannot be made for the treble damages rule of
the RICO statute, whose application is at stake here. In fact, as mentioned
above, this rule is specific to the United States and is not found either in other
major national legal systems or in international conventions. While it is, of
course, in the interest of the international community and international
commerce to prevent, also at the international level, practices such as those at
which RICO aims, it cannot be judged that the specific legal consequences of a
treble damages claim of an 'injured' party, which is the only issue at stake in
this arbitration, are a common feature of many national laws or of
international law. The Tribunal, therefore, concludes that the application of
RICO is not mandatory in the present Case.
Even if, as found above, the application of RICO is not mandatory in the
present Case, at least in theory that would not exclude that the treble damages
provision of RICO is applicable due to a choice expressed by the parties in the
Contract. For the sake of completeness, and as the parties have addressed that
issue in detail, the Tribunal therefore hereafter will examine that issue as well.
However, as will be seen, the Tribunal finds that RICO is also not applicable on
this basis of the Contract.
Id. See also discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Rome
Convention).
103.
Ministry of Defense & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic
of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
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Hence, the court, joining the streamline of lex mercatoriadecisions of
European courts, has stated that:
[T]his court's discretion in reviewing a foreign arbitration award is
quite circumscribed. See Ministry of Defense, 969 F.2d at 770. The
Tribunal's reference to and application of the UNIDROIT Principles
and principles such as good faith and fair dealing do not violate Art.
V(1)(c). The Tribunal applied these principles to differences
contemplated by and falling within the terms of the submission to
10 4
arbitration and therefore the Award does not violate Art. V(1)(c).

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there is little doubt that third-millennium
international arbitrators will face the flowering of a transnational
rule such as the UNIDROIT Principles for international commercial
contracts. They will be used to solve problems of characterization,
preliminary questions, and choice of law to the merits of the dispute.
In this sense, it appears clearly that these rules are to be construed
under a triangular scheme. Thus, lex mercatoria and transnational
rules like the UNIDROIT Principles will intervene more and more in
the arbitral choice-of-law process in three competing contexts: (1) as a
lex contractus; (2) as a means to interpret, supplement, or adapt
national law; and (3) as a means to resolve matters of interpretation
or gap-filling in international conventions. Criticism by conservative
private international law scholars towards the choice of lex
mercatoria and transnational rules seems therefore to have been
overcome by arbitral practice.
The second group of cases has shown that the antagonism
between lex mercatoria or transnational rules and domestic law is
less a matter of conflicting rules and more a problem of
harmonization of principles. Thus, the transnational test (I have
called it the TNT test) becomes a technique of adaptation of domestic
law in a transnational arbitration context. In this way it becomes
evident that many rules drawn from domestic legal systems come in
line with needs of international trade. Criticism by the lex mercatoria
orthodoxy on the parochialism offered by the application of state
conflict-of-law rules may, thus, be overcome.
Finally, awards excluding the application of the UNIDROIT
Principles show the progressive sophistication of international trade
law rules: a differentiation, within lex mercatoria,between generally
accepted principles of contract law and international trade usages
seems to be ongoing. New challenges shall be faced. Paradoxically,
the need for progressive codification of transnational law is leading
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the world community to a sort of non-binding over-codification of this
branch of law.
There are numerous commissions in charge of codification of
international contract law in many parts of the world, the most
famous being the Lando Commission whose aim is to design the
future European Civil Code. Many sets of principles presently claim
to be applied whenever lex mercatoriais at stake. 10 5 Yet in most postUNIDROIT sets of principles there is no reference to rules on conflict
of principles. The danger of over-codification becomes reality when we
consider the case of an arbitrator having to apply lex mercatoria or
transnational rules and facing two or more collections of nonbinding
principles all of which are self-declared codifications of the new law
merchant (i.e. the UNIDROIT and the European Contract Law
Principles). Which set shall prevail and why?
One global set of principles like the UNIDROIT Principles
should prevail. This would allow the rules of transnational commerce
to be more consistent and predictable in the third millennium. If this
does not happen, we will have substituted the complexity of
conflicting sets of principles for "classical problems" of conflict of laws.
Five centuries after it was made, Lanfranco da Oriano's prophecy
might still govern international arbitration from his grave, leaving a
great sense of anxiety for legal scholars willing to explain the
mysteries of transnational trade. The purpose of the present
symposium is to shed some light in the darkness of legal prejudice
and academic conservatism. I hope with the present paper to have
provided some comfort to the curious reader.
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See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PART I & II 95 (Ole Lando &
Hugh Beale eds., 1998).
Art. 1:101: Application of the Principles:(1) These Principles are intended to be
applied as general rules of contract law in the European Communities.
(2) These Principles will apply when the parties have agreed to incorporate
them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them.
(3) These Principles may be applied when the parties: (a) have agreed that
their contract is to be governed by "general principles of law," the "lex
mercatoria" or the like; or (b) have not chosen any system or rules of law to
govern their contract.
(4) These Principles may provide a solution to the issue raised where the
system or rules of law applicable do not do so.

